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politicians so reluctant to act? The answer is found in the conservatism of the province’s 
leaders, which stemmed not only from the legal training of the lawyers, but also from the 
moderate conservative ideology of the Upper Canadian leadership as a whole. At an almost 
unprecedented time of public debate, when resentment to lawyers and the courts was being 
expressed and a radical critique of the courts and the profession was emerging, Upper 
Canada’s most influential residents managed to maintain political control and steadfastly 
refused to act in advance of the mother country. 
* Te author has a PhD in Canadian History from Queen’s University at Kingston, Ontario 
and spent most of his career as a historian at the National Historic Sites Directorate of Parks 
Canada. He thanks the anonymous reviewer of his paper for extremely helpful comments. 
An earlier draft was presented to the Osgoode Society Legal History Workshop at the 
University of Toronto in 2017. 
















I. REFORMING THE COURTS DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNMENT, 1841–1849................................................................................................................ 391 
A. Regionally-based Lower Courts......................................................................................... 391 
B. Superior Courts .................................................................................................................. 394 
II. COURT REFORM AS A POLITICAL ISSUE, 1850–1853 ...................................................................... 403 
A. The Clear Grits and the Radical Spring of Legal Reform .................................................. 403 
B. Legislative Debates, 1850–1853......................................................................................... 408 
C. Epilogue.............................................................................................................................. 420 
III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 421 
THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY WAS a rare moment in the history of Upper 
Canada (later Ontario) when civil court procedure and organization became a 
subject of intense political debate. It was a time when change was in the air with 
the rise of Chartism in Britain, revolutionary movements on the continent, and 
the rhetoric of Jacksonian democracy in America. In the legal sphere, signifcant 
changes were already underway to common-law and equitable procedures in the 
province’s two touchstones, England and the United States. New York State, 
adjacent to Upper Canada, took the bold step of abolishing its equity court and 
merging common law and equity in 1848. Te British colonies of New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia began a process of reform that led to the abolition of their courts 
of Chancery in 1854 and 1855 respectively.1 Similar debates began in Upper 
Canada in the 1840s, the result of both internal pressure and external infuence. 
By the early 1850s, a handful of vociferous radicals were advocating a complete 
overhaul of the legal system which they deemed to be unfair to the majority of 
the rural population. Even Upper Canada’s lawyers could see that reform of the 
antiquated procedures of the civil law would be necessary to adapt it to the needs 
of an emerging capitalist environment. Yet, the province failed to launch much 
needed and publicly requested law reform by the mid-1850s. 
Why was Upper Canada slower to introduce reforms than these other 
common-law jurisdictions? Te reasons include the culture of its legal profession, 
the emerging moderate conservative ideology of prominent politicians and 
other leading fgures in the province, and the limited infuence of critics of the 
1. Lawrence M Friedman, A History of American Law, 3rd ed (Simon & Schuster, 2005) 
at 293-95; AH Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England and Wales, 1750–1950
(Butterworths, 1980) at 139-42; Philip Girard, “Married Women’s Property, Chancery 
Abolition, and Insolvency Law: Law Reform in Nova Scotia 1820-1867” in Philip Girard & 
Jim Phillips, eds, Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume 3: Nova Scotia (University of 
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mainstream ideology and, in particular, of the political radicals who attempted to 
represent their viewpoint. 
Te conservatism of Upper Canada’s legal profession is well known. Te 
rigorous training that the Law Society of Upper Canada required of its students 
in English common law and equity encouraged a respect for legal tradition that 
could only have been deepened by the cautious behavior of Upper Canada’s 
judges during the frst half of the nineteenth century.2 While the judges were 
reluctant to depart from English precedents, G. Blaine Baker has found that by 
mid-century many lawyers from both Upper and Lower Canada in the United 
Province of Canada were drawing on a new-found faith in the capacity for 
social reorganization to introduce legislation intended to improve foundational 
institutions.3 Tis article demonstrates the limits of Baker’s argument when 
applied to civil court reform in Upper Canada. It is true that the profession 
exerted much infuence in politics: Not only were lawyers usually the leaders of 
the two political parties, but the proportion of lawyers among Upper Canada’s 
representatives in the Assembly was never less than one third and actually slightly 
more than ffty per cent after the election of 1847.4 Although leading lawyers 
were willing to make some adjustments to adapt the courts to the needs of an 
emerging capitalist society, their goals were almost invariably to preserve as much 
of the existing system as possible—particularly its legal procedure—while waiting 
for the mother country to initiate reform. 
Upper Canada’s lawyers were not only conservative by legal training, they 
were also being infuenced by a broader ideological consensus emerging among 
the province’s leading politicians, professionals, and businessmen by the 1840s. 
Tis viewpoint, which was increasingly held not only by Reformers but also by 
Conservatives in politics, was conservative in its rejection of revolution and its 
2. G Blaine Baker, “Legal Education in Upper Canada 1785–1889: Te Law Society as 
Educator” in David H Flaherty, ed, Essays in the History of Canadian Law: Volume II
(University of Toronto Press, 1983) 49 at 50-51, 55 [Baker, “Education”]; RCB Risk, “Te 
Law and the Economy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario: A Perspective” (1977) 27 
UTLJ, 403 at 438. 
3. G Blaine Baker, “Introduction: Quebec and the Canadas, 1760–1867: A Legal 
Historiography,” in G Blaine Baker and Donald Fyson, eds, Essays in the History of Canadian 
Law, Volume XI: Quebec and the Canadas (University of Toronto Press, 2013) 3 at 310, 
316 [Baker, “Historiography”]; ibid at 37-38; G Blaine Baker, “Strategic Benthamism: 
Rehabilitating United Canada’s Bar through Criminal Law Codifcation, 1847–54” in Jim 
Phillips, R Roy McMurtry, & John T Saywell, eds, Essays in the History of Canadian Law, 
Volume X, A Tribute to Peter N Oliver (University of Toronto Press, 2008) 257 at 285-91 
[Baker, “Benthanism”]. 
4. RD Gidney & WJP Millar, Professional Gentlemen: Te Professions in Nineteenth-Century 
Ontario (University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 65. 









emphasis on the value of the British connection. Maintaining the imperial tie 
was essential in order to diferentiate the province from the United States and to 
guarantee its residents the rights and privileges of residents under the unwritten 
British Constitution. Because of their expertise in the law, the Law Society argued 
that lawyers had a special role to play as guardians of this Constitution.5 
British constitutional principles were also thought to facilitate the evolution 
of political institutions. During the 1840s, a movement took place to adopt a 
political system in Upper Canada that was more liberal than the rigid authority the 
Tories6 had attempted to enforce before the rebellion of 1837. Drawing originally 
on the eighteenth century British “Whig” interpretation of the Constitution, 
Robert Baldwin and other Reformers argued for greater public access to power 
based on the traditional right of British subjects to take part in the formation 
of government policy. By the end of the 1840s, even the Conservatives were 
coming to accept the principle that decision making should be guided by “public 
opinion” as expressed through the people’s representatives in the Assembly.7 
By doing so, the province’s politicians saw themselves, not as innovating, but as 
simply following the example of responsible British government which was only 
then being fully realized.8 
While the leaders could be described as mid-Victorian “liberals,” they remained 
steadfastly opposed to democracy. Tey believed that the hierarchical, socially, 
and economically diferentiated society, visible in the province at mid-century 
was both inevitable and desirable and that the people making political decisions 
should be those with educational qualifcations, high social status, and, in many 
cases, personal economic success. Tey watched the example of the United States 
with foreboding. While the development of American institutions had always 
been fascinating to Upper Canadians, the increasingly democratic nature of 
American politics was to be avoided, not only because it was un-British, but 
because it was thought to encourage the political participation of unqualifed 
residents and to result in policy too often determined by the passionate excesses 
5. David Mills, Te Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada, 1784–1850 (McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1988) at 5-10, 130-34. See also Graeme Patterson, “Whiggery, Nationality, and 
the Upper Canadian Reform Tradition” (1975) 56 Can Hist Rev 25 at 43-44 [Patterson, 
“Whiggery”]; Paul Romney, “From Types Riot to Rebellion: Elite Ideology, Anti-legal 
Sentiment, Political Violence and the Rule of Law in Upper Canada,” (1987) 79 Ont 
Hist 113 at 121. 
6. Te terms “Tory” and “Conservative” are used almost interchangeably here though “Tory” 
usually refers to the more far-right segment of the party and its more conservative roots. 
7. Jefrey L McNairn, Te Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in 
Upper Canada, 1791–1854 (University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 16-17, 248-60. 
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of the “mob” rather than rational debate among knowledgeable people.9 Tis 
point of view, held by the leaders of both political parties, did not bode well for 
the most vociferous supporters of major legal reform. 
By 1850, a small group of political radicals called “Clear Grits” had 
emerged to challenge both the political and the legal status quo. Tey drew on 
a strain of egalitarianism which had already been visible in the pre-rebellion 
period. Te defeat of the rebellion and the relatively small proportion of 
provincial residents who had supported it, tended to remove radicalism from 
political discourse.10 “Radicalism” re-emerged because of the realization in
“left-wing” circles of the late 1840s of how conservative the Reform Government 
of Robert Baldwin was, and because the demands for political reform elsewhere— 
in Britain, on the European continent, and in Jacksonian America—all seemed 
to presage the birth of a new day. Te radicals sought to bypass the infuence of 
the political leadership and gain the support of the farmers, small shopkeepers, 
and mechanics of the province by challenging the very nature of the social 
structure in Upper Canada and arguing that, by encouraging the development of 
a hierarchy of wealth and power, the leadership was failing to meet the needs of 
the majority of the population.11 
Tese men drew on ideas from both Britain and America. Te efort of 
Chartists to obtain political power for the sake of the working poor in Britain 
was infuential, especially among recent immigrants to Upper Canada from the 
mother country.12 However, in many ways, the United States was a closer ft for 
Upper Canada’s situation because of the similarity of its social and economic 
conditions. While immigration had begun earlier, large areas of America were still 
undergoing settlement. In spite of its commercial and industrial development, 
much of the country remained a largely agrarian society in which American 
egalitarians from both the Democratic and Whig parties strove to assert the 
9. Jane Errington, Te Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada: A Developing Colonial Ideology
(McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987) at 128-35, 188-92; Mills, supra note 5 
at 130, 132-34. 
10. See Paul Romney, Mr. Attorney: Te Attorney General for Ontario in Court, Cabinet, and 
Legislature 1791-1899 (University of Toronto Press, 1986) at 62-65 [Romney, Attorney 
General]; Mills, supra note 5 at 107-08. 
11. Kenneth C Dewar, Charles Clarke Pen and Ink Warrior (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2002) at 54-58 [Dewar, Pen and Ink]; Romney, Attorney General, supra note 10 at 319-23. 
12. Chartism was a working-class male sufrage movement for political reform in mid-nineteenth 
century Britain. On Chartism, see Malcolm Chase, Chartism: A New History (Manchester 
University Press, 2007). For the Upper Canadian reception of Chartist ideas, see Kenneth C 
Dewar, “Charles Clarke’s ‘Reformator’: Early Victorian Radicalism in Upper Canada” (1986) 
78 Ont Hist 233 at 239-41 [Dewar, “Reformator”]. 





rights of small property holders in the face of increasing concentrations of 
wealth and power.13 
Like these American politicians, Upper Canada’s radicals viewed political 
and legal reform as two prongs of an approach that would lead to a more just 
and democratic society. Adopting ideas common to both British and American 
radicalism, they traced the roots of all the people’s ills to the political system and 
sought to break down the control of the provincial political elite by decentralizing 
power and making more public ofces elective. Teir point of view on the legal 
system was based on the English principle of equality before the law, which 
had traditionally been a unifying symbol between the classes in common-law 
jurisdictions. However, their specifc proposals for reform were strongly 
infuenced by those being made by American radicals during the 1840s.14 Besides 
court decentralization, the Clear Grits and others agitated for simplifcation of 
the law to make it more easily understood by laymen, the abolition of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada in order to open the legal profession up to competition, 
and the establishment of cheap, alternative means of dispute resolution which 
would bypass the need to go through the formal courts. It was claimed that 
the present legal system, far from serving the needs of everyone equally, actually 
worked for the beneft of the most powerful persons and the lawyers serving them 
at the expense of those with limited funds. 
Not all of these proposals resonated with the public. Tey did touch on 
traditional lay suspicions of the law and its practitioners in Upper Canada and, 
in particular, on a well-spring of sentiment visible in certain rural areas which was 
resentful of privilege, suspicious of outside infuence, and fearful of exploitation 
by lawyers who manipulated the law. Some rural residents wanted to dispense 
with the services of lawyers altogether, believing that local disputes could be 
settled more cheaply and with less antagonism without the intervention of trained 
professionals. While Clear Grit politicians hoped to exploit this discontent, they 
never succeeded in winning more than a handful of seats in Parliament. 
Tree main questions of legal reform emerged during the 1840s and 1850s: 
(1) the court system’s reliance on traditional English procedures; (2) its emphasis 
on the strong centralized control of the Court of Queen’s Bench; and (3) the 
monopoly of the Law Society over the profession, which had been meant to 
facilitate the training and regulation of the highly skilled lawyers thought 
13. See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: Te Transformation of America, 
1815-1848 (Oxford University Press, 2007); Lee Benson, Te Concept of Jacksonian 
Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton University Press, 1961); Sean Wilentz, Te Rise 
of American Democracy: Jeferson to Lincoln (WW Norton & Company, 2006). 
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necessary to interpret English law. All these features had been in place since the 
1790s.15 Te Act of Union of 1840 did nothing to alter them, although by uniting 
Upper and Lower Canada for political purposes, it provided that any legislative 
reform would require the approval of a combined majority of representatives 
from the upper and lower sections of the united province. On several occasions 
in the early 1850s, this situation resulted in the preservation of Upper Canada’s 
Court of Chancery only because of the support of Lower-Canadian members.16 
Traditional English legal procedure was coming under attack in many 
common-law jurisdictions at the time. Like them, Upper Canada was grappling 
with a complex system of law in which common law and equity each had their 
own courts and procedures. Te common law adhered to antiquated forms of 
action and to patterns of pleading which were frequently prolonged. Te Court 
of Chancery was notorious in England for its high costs and dilatory procedure 
long before it was established in Upper Canada in 1837.17 Moreover, as long as 
there were separate courts of common law and equity, litigants ran the risk of 
failing in their endeavours because their claims had been brought to the wrong 
tribunal. Some disputes might require the intervention of both common-law and 
equity courts which could result in interminable delays.18 In dealing with these 
difculties, Upper Canada’s lawyers tended to be cautious. Tey believed the 
issue was how to simplify the system without losing the predictability resulting 
15. Te common law was introduced by An Act to repeal certain parts of an Act passed in the 
fourteenth year of His Majesty’s Reign, entitled “An Act for making more efectual provision for the 
Government of the Province of Quebec, in North America,” and to introduce the English Law as 
the Rule of Decision in all matters of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights, S Prov
UC 1792 (32 Geo III), c 1; the Court of King’s (later Queen’s) Bench by An Act to establish 
a Superior Court of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction and to regulate the Court of Appeal, S Prov
UC 1794 (34 Geo III), c 2 [King’s Bench, 1794, c 2]; and the Law Society by An Act for the 
better regulating the Practice of the Law, S Prov UC 1797 (37 Geo III), c 13. 
16. See e.g. Elizabeth Gibbs, ed, Debates of the Legislative Assembly of United Canada, 1841–1867
(Presses de l’École des Hautes études commerciales, 1970), vol 10 (1851) at 569 [Debates] 
(further citations will include the volume and year of original debates); Debates, vol 11 
(1852–53) at 3020-3022. 
17. See Michael Lobban, “Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of 
Chancery, Part I” (2004) 22 Law & Hist Rev 389 at 392-97. 
18. For Upper Canada, see John D Blackwell, “William Hume Blake and the Judicature Acts of 
1849: Te Process of Legal Reform at Mid-Century in Upper Canada” in David H Flaherty, 
ed, Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Volume I (University of Toronto Press, 1981) 132 
at 132 [Blackwell, “Judicature Acts”]; Elizabeth Brown, “Equitable Jurisdiction and the 
Court of Chancery in Upper Canada,” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall LJ 275; Romney, Attorney 
General, supra note 10 at 286-290; Margaret A Banks, “Te Evolution of the Ontario Courts 
1788–1981” in David H Flaherty, ed, Essays in the History of Canadian Law Volume II
(University of Toronto Press, 1983) 492 at 504-506. 









from centuries of precedents. Both Conservative and Reform lawyers expressed 
some support for reform, though the latter tended to show more enthusiasm than 
the former. Te Clear Grit members of the Reform Party were the most stridently 
insistent on the need for change. 
Te separation of common law and equity into diferent courts was part of 
a larger controversy concerning court organization. At the start of the period, 
there were two superior courts—Queen’s Bench and Chancery, as well as a 
truncated Court of Appeal. Tey were all based in Toronto, though the judges of 
the Queen’s Bench went on circuit once or twice a year to hear trials concerning 
common-law actions in the various districts. Tere were also two main courts 
of limited jurisdiction located in each district: District Courts and Courts of 
Requests. At the beginning of the Union, the District Court had a jurisdiction 
in contract covering disputes of up to forty pounds if the amount was already 
liquidated (that is, indicated by the evidence).19 Te court employed common-law 
procedures although its judges were not yet required to be barristers and there 
were no appeals to the superior courts before 1845. At the bottom of the pyramid 
were the Courts of Requests. Tey were small claims tribunals usually presided 
over by laymen justices of the peace who served as commissioners and made use 
of informal summary procedures.20 Te litigants usually represented themselves 
and did not employ lawyers. In these “poor men’s courts,” as they were known, 
actions of debt or contract of up to ten pounds in provincial currency or less were 
decided quickly, usually in much less than a day. 
While the legal profession was relatively united on the question of procedural 
reform, tensions arose over the geographical and jurisdictional structure of the 
courts. Te potential was almost inherent in the geography of the province, given 
its huge size, widely dispersed communities, and transportation difculties. Tis 
study will show that the most prominent lawyers, who were usually based in 
Toronto, believed that the centralized superior courts were the standard by which 
the court system should be judged. As such, they were particularly concerned 
during the 1840s with the shortcomings of Chancery and the Court of Appeal. 
While the need for Chancery reform was widely accepted, the question was 
19. Te District Court was established by An Act to establish a Court for the Cognizance of Small 
Causes, in each and every District of this Province, S Prov UC 1794 (34 Geo III), c 3. In 1849 
the county replaced the district as the main territorial unit for judicial and other purposes 
and the District Courts then became County Courts. 
20. Te Courts of Requests were established by An Act for the more easy and speedy Recovery of 
Small Debts, S Prov UC 1792 (32 Geo III), c 6. See JH Aitchison, “Te Courts of Requests 
in Upper Canada,” in JK Johnson, ed, Historical Essays on Upper Canada (McClelland & 
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whether equitable procedure should be revised or whether the court itself should 
be abolished and its powers handed over to the common-law courts. Te leading 
lawyers favoured reform, although lawyers residing outside Toronto often 
supported abolition. Te profession also regarded the existing Court of Appeal 
as an embarrassment. Perhaps because legislators had not expected many cases 
to require such a court, it had been given short shrift in the provisions of the 
Constitutional Act of 1791 and the provincial legislation establishing the King’s 
Bench.21 Tese measures provided only for a committee of the chief governmental 
body—the Executive Council—to hear appeals rather than a body that was fully 
professional. Under the Union, the committee consisted of the Chief Justice of 
Upper Canada or the Governor of the province, the Vice Chancellor, and any two 
other members of the council regardless of whether they had legal training.22 Tis 
tribunal was lacking in credibility and, although further appeals were possible in 
large claims to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain, they were 
prohibitively costly. 
Tere was considerable tension between central and regional interests on the 
question of the lower courts. While the leading professionals in the Assembly 
sought to standardize procedure and exert more professional control over the local 
courts, the proponents of local interests were often more concerned with increasing 
their courts’ accessibility and jurisdiction. Tere were two manifestations of this 
viewpoint. Some rural communities preferred a more informal system of local 
justice, especially for small claims. Tey hoped to limit centralized control and 
reduce the infuence of lawyers by permitting lay residents to adjudicate over 
disputes in their own neighbourhoods. Regional lawyers and creditors tended 
to be in a second camp. Tey were primarily concerned with commercial 
development which depended almost entirely on credit transactions in Upper 
Canada. Te District Courts and Courts of Requests provided the assurance that 
creditors would be paid for smaller claims but, when larger amounts of money 
were in dispute, litigants found it expensive and time consuming to have to deal 
with the superior courts. Although the judges of the Queen’s Bench traveled 
on circuit, litigants often had to hire lawyers in Toronto as well as in their own 
21. See An Act to repeal certain Parts of an Act, passed in the fourteenth Year of his Majesty’s Reign, 
intituled, An Act for making more efectual Provision for the Government of the Province of 
Quebec, in North America; and to make further Provision for the Government of the said 
Province,” S UK 1791 (31 Geo III), c 31 [An Act to repeal certain Parts of an Act, 1791]; 
King’s Bench, 1794, c 2, supra note 15. 
22. Christopher Moore, Te Court of Appeal for Ontario: Defning the Right of Appeal in Canada, 
1792–2013 (University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 4 [Moore, Appeal]. When appeals were 
made against the decisions of the Court of Chancery, the other (puisne) judges of Queen’s 
Bench also presided. Banks, supra note 18 at 502, 509, 512. 
















districts in order to reach a judgment. Te problem was worse in relation to 
the Court of Chancery. When it was established, its Vice Chancellor made no 
circuits and sat only in the capital. Te regional leaders thought a partial solution 
would be to increase the monetary limits of the lower courts. 
A third issue emerged at the end of the 1840s when criticism of the court 
system became more intense. At that point, radicals raised a cry against the legal 
profession and its rigorous control by the Law Society of Upper Canada. Under 
the Society’s regulations, a prospective barrister had to be on its books for fve 
years, to have articled with an established barrister during that time, and to have 
passed examinations set by the Society.23 He also had to attend the superior courts 
in Toronto during four terms.24 Tese regulations were much more stringent than 
those faced by lawyers in most American states, or in England at the time, and 
they often seemed to favour persons from families associated in some way with 
the political and legal establishment at Toronto.25 During the Union period, 
the Clear Grits and other critics saw the profession and its governing body as 
a privileged group which tended to manipulate the law primarily for its own 
interests rather than those of the people as a whole.26 Tis belief became more 
widespread after the Reform Government of Robert Baldwin passed the Judicature 
Acts of 1849 expanding the centralized superior courts.27 It became law mainly 
due to pressure from leading Toronto lawyers, but seemed of little beneft to 
many of the province’s residents. Drawing on public resentment, radicals began 
arguing for broadening access to the profession and establishing a free market in 
legal services. 
Te debate over these issues unfolded over two time periods: 1841–1849 
and 1850–1853. During the former time period, the main focus of politics was 
on the struggle over responsible government. Te discussion of legal reform 
was sporadic and usually confned only to lawyers. It was dominated largely, 
though not completely, by the leaders of the profession who sought to improve 
23. Baker, “Education,” supra note 2 at 49-55. 
24. Ibid at 66, 68, 119; Christopher Moore, Te Law Society of Upper Canada and Ontario’s 
Lawyers, 1797–1997 (University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 88-92. 
25. Baker, “Education,” supra note 2 at 79-80. 
26. See e.g. North American (4 June 1850, 22 November 1850), Ottawa, Library and Archives 
Canada (accessed on microflm). 
27. An Act to make further provision for the Administration of Justice, by the establishment 
of an additional Superior Court of Common Law and also a Court of Error and Appeal, 
in Upper-Canada, and for other purposes, S Prov C 1849 (12 Vict), c 63 [S Prov C 1849 (12 
Vict), c 63]; An Act for the more efectual Administration of Justice in the Court of Chancery 
of the late Province of Upper-Canada, S Prov C 1849 (12 Vict), c 64 [S Prov C 1849 
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the centralized superior courts at Toronto. Te expansion of these courts in 1849 
represented the culmination of their eforts, but it also resulted in an outburst 
of public resentment and cries for radical change which made court reform a 
major political issue over the next four years. Ultimately, all these challenges to 
the status quo failed because of the distaste of Upper Canada’s leaders for radical 
reform and their ability, along with their allies in Lower Canada, to maintain 
control over the Legislative Assembly. 
I. REFORMING THE COURTS DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1841–1849 
Drawing on their training and the predominantly conservative ideology of the 
province, the most prominent legal professionals sought to adapt the court system 
to changing provincial conditions during the 1840s while maintaining the bulk 
of its English heritage. While much of the history of court reform during these 
years dealt with the superior courts, the period began with a confrontation over 
the lower courts in which leading lawyer–politicians found themselves at odds 
with members of the Assembly representing constituencies outside Toronto, 
particularly those with more radical inclinations. 
A. REGIONALLY-BASED LOWER COURTS 
Te battle lines over the lower courts were drawn in 1841 when Tory Attorney 
General William Draper introduced bills to reform both the District Courts and 
Courts of Requests. Tese reforms were similar to eforts being made in England 
at the time to foster wider legal uniformity and professionalization in the justice 
system.28 Under Draper’s legislation, the lower courts received more professional 
supervision by requiring the District Court judges to be barristers and by 
replacing the Courts of Requests with Division Courts. Te jurisdiction of the 
latter courts was initially identical to that of the old courts and the procedure 
was still supposed to be summary, but the Division Courts were to be presided 
over by the nineteen District Court judges located across the province rather 
than the lay judges of the Courts of Requests. Draper commented that there had 
been over one thousand of these lay commissioners scattered over the province, 
28. An Act to repeal the Laws now in force in that part of this Province, formerly Upper Canada, for 
the recovery of Small Debts, and to make other provisions therefor, S Prov C 1841 (4 & 5 Vict), 
c 3 (creating the Division Courts); An Act to alter and amend the Laws now in force in that 
part of this Province formerly Upper Canada regulating the District Courts, S Prov C 1841 (4 & 
5 Vict), c 8 (creating the District Courts). 









many of them living in the communities they served, which raised the possibility 
of favouritism. He claimed that his judges would be educated men, free of the 
prejudice of locality. However, since his proposal created a potentially heavy 
workload for the District Court judges who, in addition to their other duties, 
also had to ofciate over the Quarter Sessions29 and Surrogate Courts in their 
districts, a limit was placed on the number of Division Courts to be created in 
each district: Initially the maximum was six in each district. Before 1841, there 
had been 23 Courts of Requests in the Home District alone and 187 in total 
scattered over the province as a whole.30 
Te main opposition to the Division Courts was led by a group of fve 
laymen Reform members living outside Toronto who expressed serious doubts 
about the value of professionalism and centralization.31 Similar views about the 
court system would be expressed again by representatives of rural areas during 
the early 1850s. Te Courts of Requests, they said, were largely satisfactory as 
they were. Te lay judges in them had the opportunity to work with suitors in 
their communities to facilitate a cheaper and more harmonious settlement of 
diferences than was possible through the formal process of the law. According to 
John Roblin, a prominent farmer from the Bay of Quinte area, the new proposal 
would deprive the poor man of justice.32 Te number of small claims courts was 
not only to be greatly reduced, but they would only hold hearings once every two 
months instead of every fortnight as in the Courts of Requests. For suitors outside 
the main towns, the result would be the necessity to travel substantial distances 
to a court that met less frequently: Te court would then be overburdened and 
suitors would have to wait for three or four days instead of the traditional one day 
or less to get their cases heard. In these circumstances, the poor would not be able 
to aford the expense of attending. Instead of replacing the Courts of Requests, 
Roblin and W.H. Merritt, a well-known Niagara area businessman who favoured 
local interests and control, recommended that their jurisdiction be increased 
from ten to ffty pounds in claims of debt or contract in order to make the court 
system more accessible to suitors in the regions.33 
29. Te Quarter Sessions dealt with local administrative issues and minor crime. See Banks, supra
note 18 at 494. 
30. Debates, supra note 16 at vol 1 (1841) at 234; Aitchison, supra note 20 at 92-94. 
31. Tese members were all merchants or entrepreneurs with the exception of one farmer. 
Draper’s bill was passed by a vote of forty to eleven. See Debates, supra note 16, vol 1 
(1841) at 488-89. 
32. Ibid at 488. 
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When it became clear that a bill enabling reform of the Division Courts would 
pass, the rhetoric between the two sides heated up. While opponents supported 
easier access to the law, Draper argued that cheap law was not necessarily a 
good thing and tended to promote unsubstantiated claims. He believed that 
the business of the Court of Requests had already escalated to unhealthy levels 
while the new system, by making it more difcult for plaintifs to sue, would 
discourage fraudulent or frivolous suits. Leading politicians and lawyers would 
make similar criticisms of “cheap law”34 in the coming years. Merritt and Roblin 
responded that there were too many lawyers in the Legislature and they were too 
ready to provide judgeships for members of their profession at the expense of 
the interests of the yeomanry.35 Te rhetoric of yeomanry versus lawyers was one 
that was already visible among radical Reformers before the Rebellion of 1837. 
It was part of an egalitarian point of view which would be expressed more fully 
after 1849. In the early 1840s, it represented a minority opinion among elected 
representatives, discredited to some extent by the violence of the Rebellion and 
muzzled by the need for a united front among Reformers seeking to bring about 
constitutional change through the achievement of responsible government. 
Demands continued to be made for a legal system more sensitive to the needs 
of persons outside Toronto during the rest of the 1840s. Te most common appeal 
was for an expansion of both the geographical accessibility and the jurisdiction 
of the Division Courts. At least seventeen petitions on the subject of accessibility 
were submitted to the Assembly from persons and municipalities in diferent 
parts of the province between 1843 and 1849, almost all seeking to re-establish 
the Courts of Requests. While the petitioners stressed the need for more courts, 
their preference for the Courts of Requests also suggests that they were satisfed 
with lay judges. Te government agreed to increase the number of courts but 
refused to budge on the issue of professional control. Te maximum number of 
courts in each district was increased from six to nine in 184536 and expanded again 
to twelve in 1850.37 Pressure was also exerted to expand the jurisdiction of the 
34. Ibid at 236, 360. 
35. Ibid. 
36. An Act to amend an Act passed in the fourth and ffth years of the reign of Her Majesty, entitled, 
An Act to repeal the laws now in force in that part of this Province formerly Upper Canada, 
for the recovery of Small Debts, and to make other provisions therefor, S Prov C 1844-1845 
(8 Vict), c 37. 
37. An Act to amend and consolidate the several Acts now in force, regulating the Practice of Division 
Courts in Upper Canada, and to extend the jurisdiction thereof, S Prov C 1850 (13 & 14 Vict), 
c 53. Te published debates reveal eight petitions presented in 1843, three more in 1844-45, 
two in 1846, one in 1847, one in 1848, and seven in 1849. See also Banks, supra note 
18 at 502, 509. 















Division Courts and, by the later 1840s, jurists and politicians began to rethink 
their position in order to satisfy popular demand. In 1847, Judge Robert Easton 
Burns of the Home District published a pamphlet recommending reforms in the 
Division Courts, including an increase in their monetary jurisdiction. In 1849, 
former Tory Attorney General Henry Sherwood pushed for an expansion of the 
monetary limit, but was blocked by the Reform Government.38 
Controversy also arose over the District Courts. In 1845, the Conservative 
government of William Draper presented a consolidating act which represented 
a further efort to professionalize these courts by providing for appeals from 
their decisions to the Queen’s Bench and for standardized pleadings between the 
District and Queen’s Bench courts. Reform leader Robert Baldwin supported 
fellow barrister Sherwood in this legislation in spite of their political diferences. 
However, this act also led to mounting demands for increasing the fnancial 
jurisdiction of the District Courts. Te question would have been of particular 
interest to regional lawyers who tended to rely on the District Courts for much 
of their business. While Draper’s act made modest improvements in jurisdiction, 
several lawyers from outside of Toronto demanded greater changes. Speaking 
on their behalf, Conservative lawyer George Macdonell of Dundas argued that 
the present bill might increase the business of lawyers around Toronto, but it 
would not aid the outlying districts far from the courts of superior jurisdiction.39 
He renewed his demands in 1847, revealing his frustration at the mount of legal 
business reserved for Toronto barristers due to their proximity to the superior 
courts. He argued without success that the District Courts “were highly popular 
judicatories and were only confned to small sums to suit a few city lawyers.”40 
Drawing the battle lines clearly, Attorney General Sherwood dismissed his 
criticism as the meddling of “a country lawyer.”41 
B. SUPERIOR COURTS 
While the question of procedural reform was coming to the fore in the United 
States, and to a lesser extent in Britain during the 1840s, there was only limited 
interest in this issue in the colonies of Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, and New 
38. Debates, supra note 16, vol 4 (1844–45) at 243, 1933-34; ibid, vol 8 (1849) at 429; 
RE Burns, A Letter on the Subject of Division Courts: with proposed alterations in the 
jurisdiction and details of the system (Scobie and Balfour, 1847); letter from Gowan to 
Baldwin (20 March 1849) Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (Letterbook 6, accessed 
on microflm in the Gowan fonds); Gowan to Baldwin (21 April 1850) Toronto, Toronto 
Reference Library (Robert Baldwin fonds). 
39. Debates, supra note 16, vol 4 (1844-45) at 294, 1441-42. 
40. Debates, supra note 16, vol 7 (1847) at 376. 
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Brunswick until the late 1840s. Once the principle of responsible government 
was resolved, a debate on law reform quickly emerged in the Maritimes and 
led to the establishment of law reform commissions in both Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick in 1851.42 However, by this time, the leading lawyers of Upper 
Canada had already been considering the question of Chancery reform for some 
time because of circumstances resulting from the creation of the Union. Te 
union of the upper and lower provinces had resulted in the need for a common 
seat of government: it was initially situated at Kingston, which was located 
between Montréal and Toronto, the major cities of the two sections. Te head 
of Chancery, Vice Chancellor Robert Sympson Jameson, had then moved the 
Court of Chancery to Kingston where he was also serving as the Speaker of the 
Legislative Council. Prominent members of the Toronto bar were infuriated.43 
In protest, the Law Society of Upper Canada drew up a memorial to the Governor 
General in 1842, which resulted in the appointment of a commission in 1843 to 
examine the question of Chancery as a whole, and especially the problems of its 
delays and expense.44 
Te Chancery Commission was decidedly conservative in its approach 
to reform. Composed of some of the most respected jurists and lawyers in 
Upper Canada, its members included the old Tory leader, Chief Justice John 
Beverley Robinson, Judge James Buchanan Macaulay of the Queen’s Bench, Vice 
Chancellor Jameson, and three rising young Chancery counsel—R.E. Burns, 
W.H. Blake, and James Christie Palmer Esten.45 In two reports released in 1844 
42. Greg Marquis, “Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Mid-Victorian New Brunswick,” (1987) 36 
UNBLJ 163 at 166-67 [Marquis, “Anti-Lawyer”]; Girard, “Married Women,” supra
note 1 at 108-09. 
43. Jameson and his court went back to Toronto in 1843. See John D Blackwell, “Jameson, 
Robert Sympson,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography [DCB], online: <www. 
biographi.ca/en/bio/jameson_robert_sympson_8E.html> [perma.cc/ZB8G-VKF4] 
[Blackwell, “Jameson”]. 
44. John D Blackwell, William Hume Blake and Judicial Reform in the United Province of Canada
(MA Tesis, Queen’s University, 1980) [unpublished] at 59, 60 [Blackwell, Tesis]. 
45. On Robinson, see Patrick Brode, Sir John Beverley Robinson: Bone and Sinew of the Compact
(University of Toronto Press, 1984). For the others, see the following DCB entries online. 
Gordon Dodds, “Macaulay, Sir James Buchanan,” online: Dictionary of Canadian Biography
<www.biographi.ca/en/bio/macaulay_james_buchanan_8E.html> [perma.cc/5QU9-5FM3]; 
Blackwell, “Jameson,” supra note 43; Brian H Morrison, “Burns, Robert Easton,” online: 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography <www.biographi.ca/en/bio/burns_robert_easton_9E. 
html> [perma.cc/5DRM-Q4NP]; Donald Swainson, “Blake, William Hume,” DCB, online: 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography <www.biographi.ca/en/bio/blake_william_hume_9E.html> 
[perma.cc/N3G7-X2YS]; Robert Hett, “Esten, James Christie Palmer,” online: Dictionary 
of Canadian Biography <www.biographi.ca/en/bio/esten_james_christie_palmer_9E.html> 
[perma.cc/3M2L-7Z7S]. 
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and 1845, the commission recommended against making major changes to the 
court. Te best course was gradual reform based on measures tried in the mother 
country. Delays could not be reduced substantially. While they were greater in 
equity than in the common law, this was understandable because equity looked 
at all the outstanding points of a dispute rather than specifc allegations and its 
decisions sometimes embraced the interests of numerous parties.46 
While the Court of Chancery was often criticized as a tribunal for parties 
with large pockets, the commissioners were reluctant to make it more accessible. 
Like Draper in 1841, they showed themselves suspicious of the motives of parties 
with limited funds. In the report, they referred cryptically to past transactions 
that might be subject to groundless claims of fraudulent behaviour if persons of 
humble means were given access to an equitable jurisdiction.47 Tey were almost 
certainly alluding to the substantial amounts of landed property which had been 
lost on defaulted mortgages prior to the establishment of the Court of Chancery. 
As judges, Robinson and Macaulay were engaged at this time in trying to protect 
the interests of large property holders and prevent the disruption that would 
result if these properties were redeemed. On the commission, they favoured 
reducing equitable costs “without afecting to make the Court of Chancery that 
kind of cheap tribunal, that parties may be tempted by the facility of access, 
to abuse its purposes, and make it what it is capable of being made, one of the 
worst afictions a country can sufer under.”48 
However, the commissioners were willing to go beyond English practice 
in one important respect. Tey proposed abolishing the oft-criticized, lengthy, 
and costly process of a detailed written bill, interrogatories, and answers, and 
replacing it with a much shorter written bill and answer that would be followed 
by viva voce examination of the parties before a judge in court at nisi prius; that is, 
by a common-law judge on assize. For the frst time, the defendant would also be 
46. Te frst report appeared in 1844; it was not published and now seems lost. See Blackwell, 
“Judicature Acts,” supra note 18 at 143. For the second report, see Province of Canada, 
Legislative Assembly, “Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider and report 
what alterations it may be expedient to make in the practice and proceedings of the Court 
of Chancery in Upper Canada,” Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Appendix JJ (4 March 
1845) online: <eco.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.9_00955_4_2/206?r=0&s=1> [perma.cc/ 
X5LM-BB7L] [Chancery Report]. 
47. Chancery Report, supra note 46. 
48. Ibid at 5. During 1845-46, Robinson and Macaulay were sitting as members of the Court 
of Appeal in the important case of Simpson v Smyth in which they denied the right of 
Smyth’s heirs to redeem. See JC Weaver, “While Equity Slumbered: Creditor Advantage, 
a Capitalist Land Market, and Upper Canada’s Missing Court,” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall 
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permitted to examine the plaintif as to the veracity of his case in the original suit 
instead of by a cross bill. While prominent English members of the profession 
believed such changes would interfere with the rights of parties to a full and fair 
hearing, the expense of the existing system was harder to justify in Upper Canada 
where most cases involved relatively small fnancial amounts. Te commissioners 
supported lowering costs “within a limit somewhat in proportion to the value 
of the business to be transacted” without afecting the essentials of Chancery 
practice.49 In their frst report, they made specifc recommendations for change 
that were subsequently accepted by government, including reforms to mortgage 
foreclosure procedure, which took up the bulk of the business of Chancery in 
these years.50 Teir proposals were expected to reduce costs in such disputes by 
half. In the second report, in 1845, the commissioners concluded by proposing 
that some mechanism be put in place for an ongoing review of rule changes.51 
While the Commission was urging a cautious approach, hostility to the 
Court of Chancery was being expressed by lawyers and other members of 
both political parties in the Legislature. In both 1845 and 1846, the House of 
Assembly agreed to debate the possibility of abolishing the court and shifting its 
jurisdiction to the common-law courts. Resolutions in favour of this change were 
defeated in both years, but with strong minorities supporting the idea: In 1846, 
the vote was twenty-fve to nineteen. Tose in favour of abolition pointed to the 
public hostility against the court because of its high costs and delays and the fact 
that it met only in Toronto. Tis pressure was resisted by William Draper and 
Robert Baldwin, the Toronto barristers who led the Conservatives and Reformers 
respectively. Eager to protect the sanctity of the English law, they stressed the 
difculty of merging equity and the common law and argued that most learned 
English lawyers were against abolition.52 
At the same time as these debates were going on, R.E. Burns and W.H. 
Blake, two former members of the Chancery Commission, were putting forward 
a plan that sought to deal with both the ills of Chancery and the lack of a credible 
appeals court by expanding the central court machinery. Tis proposal, which 
49. Chancery Report, supra note 46 at 5. See also Blackwell, “Judicature Acts,” supra
note 18 at 145. 
50. According to information in the papers of William Lyon Mackenzie, mortgage foreclosures 
made up 216 of the 246 cases considered by Chancery between January 1845 and March 
1851. See press clipping (undated), Toronto, Archives of Ontario, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds 
(fle 5454, MU 1888, series A-2, Mackenzie-Lindsey family fonds, F 37) [Press clipping, 
Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds]. 
51. Chancery Report, supra note 46. Blackwell, “Judicature Acts,” supra note 18 at 145. 
52. Debates, supra note 16, vol 4 (1844-45) at 1625-27; ibid, vol 5 (1846) at 1575-80. 












would eventually lead to the reforms of 1849, was frst put forward in 1845 and 
sought to create a second superior court of common law in addition to Queen’s 
Bench, appoint two more judges to the Court of Chancery, and establish a court 
of appeal that would be stafed by judges from the three courts. Tese changes 
would increase the capacity of the trial courts to hear cases at frst instance, 
although the evidence from the time indicates that there was no bottleneck of 
business. It would also improve the credibility of the appeal court, which would 
now be composed solely of legal professionals for the frst time. By appointing 
two more judges to the Chancery Court, Burns sought to remedy the perceived 
weakness of the court under the cautious Jameson whose decisions were frequently 
being questioned and overturned on appeal.53 
Blake gave a lengthy defence of the new plan in a published pamphlet and in 
letters to Reform Attorney General Robert Baldwin whom he hoped to win his 
cause. Improving the Chancery, he said, was “the smallest part of the plan.”54 Te 
major goal was to establish a more efective court of appeal. Blake believed that 
for the administration of the law to become “the greatest boon to civilized life,” 
the courts must be seen to be professional and even-handed.55 At present, there 
was no efective process of review. Te only members of the profession who were 
eligible to sit on all cases heard by the appellate body were Chief Justice Robinson 
and Vice Chancellor Jameson. In the absence of more legal talent, the body was 
dominated by the Chief Justice. Te result was that, while appeals had been 
brought from the Court of Chancery, none had ever been submitted from the 
Queen’s Bench. Beyond the provincial level, an appeal was possible to Britain, but 
this step was so expensive and took so long “that it amount[ed] in efect to a total 
denial of justice.”56 An efective appeals process based primarily in Canada would 
not only be quicker and cheaper for suitors than appealing to Britain, but its 
decisions would also carry the moral sanction of justice seen to be done. Te cost 
of expanding the courts, while signifcant, would be inconsiderable compared to 
the risk of a ruinous suit which would bring the judicial system into disrepute.57 
Blake’s plan made little impression at frst. Baldwin declared himself convinced 
in principle, but he was reluctant to take up the proposal unless the governing 
Conservatives were on side. Tey were not. Te administrations of W.H. Draper 
53. Debates, supra note 16, vol 4 (1844-45) at 982, 1051, 1854; Wm H Blake, A Letter to the 
Honourable Robert Baldwin, from Wm H Blake, AB, Professor of Law in the University of King’s 
College, Upon the Administration of Justice in the Western Province (George Brown, 1845). 
54. Blackwell, “Judicature Acts,” supra note 18 at 147. 
55. Ibid at 148. See also Moore, Appeal, supra note 22 at 10-16. 
56. Blackwell, “Judicature Acts,” supra note 18 at 148. 
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from 1845–1847 and Henry Sherwood later in 1847 were distracted by the 
economic crisis, the Irish famine migration, and their relatively fragile hold on 
power. Draper acknowledged the need for a better process of judicial appeal, but 
felt that the amount of business in the Queen’s Bench did not justify the creation 
of a second common-law court.58 Both he and Sherwood were concerned with 
the high administrative costs of justice and fearful of the public outcry which 
would almost certainly come from expanding the centralized court system. 
Te turning point came with the election of 1848, which created a substantial 
Reform majority in the Legislature. W.H. Blake was now appointed Solicitor 
General by Robert Baldwin. Te momentum for reform had also grown within 
the legal establishment. Te profession in Toronto now supported the proposals 
albeit with some reservations. A meeting at Osgoode Hall in the fall of 1848 
endorsed Blake’s proposals because of the need for a better appeal procedure 
but, while favouring the expansion of Chancery to three judges, it said nothing 
about another common-law court.59 Petitions by Skefngton Connor (Blake’s 
brother-in-law) and by Robert Burns and other members of the profession were 
presented to the Legislature early in 1849 urging the government to act because 
of the need for a proper appeal procedure.60 
Balanced against these public expressions were the privately-conveyed 
reservations of three judges of the Queen’s Bench consulted by Blake: Chief 
Justice Robinson and puisne judges Macaulay and Archibald McLean. Writing 
to Blake, all three were skeptical of the expansion and, while their viewpoints 
difered, there was considerable concern that the amount of legal business at 
the superior-court level did not justify the added expense. On the question of 
Chancery, it is interesting to note that two of the three judges of the supposedly 
tradition-bound Queen’s Bench were leaning towards abolishing Chancery and 
transferring equitable jurisdiction to a common-law court. While Robinson 
demurred, Macaulay and McLean suggested this possibility although it would 
represent a break from English practice.61 Even among its leaders, the profession 
was divided on the question of law reform. 
Outside of the profession, the question of expansion at frst elicited little 
reaction probably because it was viewed chiefy as an issue for legal professionals. 
58. Michael S Cross, A Biography of Robert Baldwin: Te Morning-Star of Memory (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 184-85, 238, 259-60; Debates, supra note 16, vol 5 
(1846) at 333-34. 
59. Blackwell, “Judicature Acts,” supra note 18 at 154. 
60. Debates, supra note 16, vol 8 (1849) at 278, 1822. 
61. Letters from Blake to Baldwin (7, 25 September 1848) and from John Beverley Robinson to 
Baldwin (8 June 1849), Toronto, Toronto Reference Library (Robert Baldwin fonds). 










Te radical Toronto Examiner, however, revealed what the proponents could 
expect if it went ahead. Tis journal, previously aligned with the Reform party, 
attacked the plan from the point of view of farmers and mechanics, characterizing 
it as too expensive and “a bold and open conspiracy for the beneft of the [legal] 
craft.”62 Instead of establishing a new common-law court to aid in assembling a 
competent court of appeal, the Toronto Examiner recommended that the latter 
could be made up of superior-court judges, supplemented when necessary by 
judges of the lower courts. Te suggestion testifed to the lack of sympathy felt by 
some laymen towards the centralized courts which they regarded as less relevant 
to the needs of the people than the regional courts. 
In spite of these criticisms, Blake’s proposals were introduced in Parliament 
early in 1849 in the form of two bills. Te frst dealt with Chancery, increasing the 
number of judges to three and acting on the earlier commission’s recommendations 
that practice be simplifed while authorizing the judges to look further into this 
matter. Te second bill established new courts of common law and of error 
and appeal. At the trial level, this measure reduced the number of judges in the 
Queen’s Bench from fve to three while creating a Court of Common Pleas with 
three judges. Tis court was to have equal and concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Queen’s Bench and was to follow the Queen’s Bench’s mode of procedure. Te 
regional capacity of the superior-court system was also expanded. Commissions 
could now issue three times a year for common law judges to go on circuit in 
the regions outside Toronto. Te Court of Appeal would be fully professional, 
consisting of the nine judges from the trial courts.63 
Te Reform government introduced these bills in March during the crisis 
sparked by the Rebellion Losses Bill which sought to compensate persons who had 
lost property during the Lower Canadian Rebellion of 1837–1838.64 Because 
people who had been sympathetic to the rebels might be compensated, the 
bill infamed Tories who had been instrumental in suppressing the uprising. 
62. Toronto Examiner (12 November 1848), Toronto, Archives of Ontario, Mackenzie-Lindsey 
fonds (fle 5494, MU 1891). 
63. Tese bills became two separate acts, one concerning the Courts of Common Pleas and of 
Error and Appeal and the other concerning the Court of Chancery. See S Prov C 1849 (12 
Vict), c 63, supra note 27; S Prov C 1849 (12 Vict), c 63, c 64, supra note 27. An appeal 
from the Court of Error and Appeal to the British Privy Council was possible when the 
amount of the dispute exceeded 1,000 pounds. 
64. An Act to provide for the Indemnifcation of Parties in Lower Canada whose Property was 
destroyed during the Rebellion in the years 1837 and 1838, S Prov C 1849 (12 Vict), 
c 58 [Rebellion Losses Bill]. See also JMS Careless, Te Union of the Canadas 1841–1857
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When Governor General Elgin approved the legislation, thus afrming that 
he would uphold the principle of “responsible government” by bowing to the 
will of Parliament, the Tories felt betrayed by the Crown whom they believed 
themselves to have been serving during the Rebellion. Conservative supporters 
rioted in the streets of Montreal and burned down the parliament buildings on 
the 25 April 1849. 
In this atmosphere, the court reforms received limited attention in the 
Assembly. On second reading of the court bills on 15 May 1849, only four 
members opposed them—the old radical Louis Joseph Papineau from Lower 
Canada, and three Conservative lawyers from Upper Canada—Henry Sherwood 
of Toronto, Henry Smith of Frontenac, and the young John A. Macdonald 
of Kingston. On the third reading, held on 21 May 1849, George Sherwood, 
brother of Henry and a Conservative lawyer from Brockville, led the opposition.65 
He opposed increasing the number of Chancery judges and argued that the bill 
to create Common Pleas and a new appellate court be returned to committee 
with an instruction to “report upon the propriety of increasing the jurisdiction 
and efciency of the present Local and Inferior Courts in Upper Canada, and to 
relieve the Court of Queen’s Bench from a great portion of civil business.”66 Te 
latter motion was supported by six Upper-Canadian representatives from outside 
Toronto, refecting once again the lack of enthusiasm for the centralized courts in 
the regions. In spite of this opposition, the two bills passed and became known 
as the Judicature Acts at the end of May 1849.67 
After passage, criticism of the measures began to emerge chiefy from radical 
supporters of the Reform Party. Resentment was expressed at public meetings in 
two strongly reform-oriented regions. A gathering to protest the reforms held at 
Sharon, north of Toronto, in October 1849 drew participants from fve townships 
and three ridings in the surrounding area. Sharon itself was the headquarters 
for the Reverend David Willson’s Children of Peace sect, which had supported 
William Lyon Mackenzie prior to the Rebellion. Te meeting singled out Robert 
Baldwin for censure.68 A second gathering, held in Grantham Township, in the 
Niagara area, resulted in more explicit demands for popularly based justice. Its 
proposals were framed within a broader demand for fnancial retrenchment and 
65. Debates, supra note 16, vol 8 (1849) at 2323. 
66. Ibid at 2379. 
67. Ibid at 2378-80; S Prov C 1849 (12 Vict), c 63, c 64. 
68. Toronto Examiner (7 November 1849), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed 
on microflm). See also SD Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640–1840 
(University of Toronto Press, 1959) at 424-25. 










making local governmental institutions elective. Concerned primarily with the 
local courts, the participants argued that even the fees of the Division Courts 
were too expensive and that the collection of small debts could be made cheaper 
by taking the jurisdiction out of the hands of the district court judges and placing 
it in the hands of the township councils or elected commissioners’ courts.69 
Unwilling to speak up during the tumult of the session, the Toronto Examiner
led the way among Reform journals. Published by James Lesslie, an old colleague 
of William Lyon Mackenzie, the Toronto Examiner argued that “hitherto a 
language and a host of useless forms peculiar to the legal tribe has been used to 
make law a proftable mystery … the more plausibly to draw upon the resources 
of litigants, and to enrich the practitioner.” Te journal called for reform that 
would make “justice simple, cheap, and accessible to the poorest in the land.”70 
Here were several ingredients of an emerging radical critique. Te law was 
seen to serve the interests of lawyers and, by inference, of well-heeled suitors. 
It put the poor at a disadvantage since they required cheap justice in order to 
have equal access to the law. Instead of alleviating these problems, the expanded 
system of superior courts added to them by increasing the overall costs of justice. 
Te Toronto Examiner and other Reform sources were rapidly concluding that 
the party of Robert Baldwin was establishment oriented and did not necessarily 
represent the interests or beliefs of common people such as farmers and 
mechanics. Tis recognition was expressed in terms of a conspiracy. Te party 
had been infltrated by Blake and other “cunning attorneys” from Toronto who 
raised a howl for law reform and then brought in legislation creating new jobs for 
themselves and their friends.71 Te comments became particularly biting when 
Blake left the government in autumn 1849 in order to head up the enlarged 
Court of Chancery. Many Reformers felt betrayed. Tey charged that the old 
Tory clique had been replaced with a new “legal aristocracy.” Tere was growing 
criticism of the lawyers in the Assembly where they comprised more than half of 
Upper Canada’s representatives. Elected because of their specialized knowledge, 
69. “Great Reform Meeting at the 10 Mile Creek, Grantham Township,” press clipping, 
(undated, c1849), Toronto, Archives of Ontario, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds (fle 
5460, MU 1889). 
70. Toronto Examiner (12 December 1849), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada 
(accessed on microflm). 
71. “Trown Overboard” (undated), Press clipping, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds, supra note 50 
(fle 5459, MU 1889). See also letter from James Lesslie to William Lyon Mackenzie (20 
September 1849), correspondence at 7282-290, ibid; Toronto Examiner (19 December 
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the Toronto Examiner argued that they tended to legislate mainly for themselves 
and deserved to be reduced in numbers at the next election.72 
By the end of the 1840s, several viewpoints had surfaced on court reform. 
Te leaders of the profession had been willing to consider procedural reform but, 
in keeping with their respect for the English legal tradition, they were extremely 
cautious about doing so. Teir emphasis on the centralized superior courts as the 
primary measure of the system’s credibility had led them to expand this part of 
the system in order to ofset the problems identifed with the Court of Chancery 
and the appeals court. However, they also faced pressure from persons in the 
regions for improvements in the local system of justice, and some of this pressure, 
particularly from rural areas, revealed a suspicion about legal procedures and the 
role of lawyers which began to be expressed more forcefully after 1849. 
II. COURT REFORM AS A POLITICAL ISSUE, 1850–1853 
In 1850, further reform of the civil courts seemed imminent. Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick were moving towards reform and a new code of civil procedure had 
been in place next door in New York State since 1848.73 A backlash was emerging 
to the expansion of the superior courts in Upper Canada and, particularly, once 
again to equitable procedure and the Court of Chancery. Over the next three 
years, a series of proposals were put forth in an efort to make the legal system 
more accessible and less costly to suitors. Tese years saw the emergence of 
the Clear Grits and other radical spokesmen whose wide-ranging demands for 
change alarmed and infuriated leading lawyers and politicians. However, while 
members of the profession resisted major changes, even they understood that 
some concessions would be necessary to defuse public discontent. 
A. THE CLEAR GRITS AND THE RADICAL SPRING OF LEGAL REFORM 
Te political crisis of 1849 had confrmed that responsible government was in 
place and the Reform Party was frmly in control. With this realization came 
an outpouring of radical sentiment on legal and political questions suppressed 
during the long struggle for responsible government. 
Tis sentiment was seized upon by a small group of political radicals who 
came together during the winter of 1849–1850 to form a loose coalition called 
72. Toronto Examiner cited in Toronto Globe (11 December 1849), Ottawa, Library and Archives 
Canada (accessed on microflm); letter from Lesslie to Mackenzie (20 September 1849), Press 
clipping, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds, supra note 50. 
73.  Friedman, supra note 1 at 293-95. 









the Clear Grits. Te group consisted of two intersecting circles of people. Te 
older circle included veteran reformers such as the journalist James Lesslie of the
Toronto Examiner who had been active before the Rebellion of 1837. Te old rebel 
William Lyon Mackenzie was in touch with Lesslie in Toronto prior to his return 
from exile in New York in May 1850. Te younger circle included Toronto-born 
lawyer William McDougall and recently arrived British immigrants like the 
journalist Charles Clarke. While they sought to appeal mainly to the farmers 
and mechanics of the province, these men were predominantly middle class— 
newspaper men, professionals, and businessmen.74 Tey were all infuenced to 
varying degrees by the egalitarian ideas of American and British radicals. 
Charles Clarke became the intellectual leader of the Clear Grits. Writing 
under the pseudonym “Reformator,” he submitted articles to the Irish-Catholic 
journal, the Toronto Mirror, in 1849 and 1850, which were widely reprinted 
in reform journals across Upper Canada. After the North American became the 
main organ of the Clear Grits under the editorship of William McDougall in 
Toronto, Clarke continued his eforts with a series of columns in that journal 
in 1851. He admired America’s democratic activists, but he also had frst-hand 
knowledge of the Chartist fght for universal sufrage in Britain and based his 
political philosophy on the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and his principle of 
pursuing the greatest happiness for the greatest number.75 
Clarke looked forward to creating a society in which individual freedom 
would prevail and a more equal distribution of wealth and power would be 
accomplished with the aid of changes to the political system. Drawing on an 
argument central to both British and American radicals,76 he saw the chief 
evil to be monopolies, or concentrations of power of any kind, and the main 
means of rooting them out to be by introducing reforms to the political system, 
such as a broadened franchise and the establishment of elective institutions, 
particularly at the local level. Like many radicals, Charles Clarke was emphatic 
in his argument for decentralization as a means of utilizing the shared interests of 
local communities to forestall the tendency of central political bodies to acquire 
increased power. Trough these reforms, the sovereignty of the people could 
be asserted over existing political elites frst at the local and then at the central 
74. JMS Careless, Brown of the Globe Volume I: Te Voice of Upper Canada 1818–1859
(Macmillan, 1959) at 104-11, 117; Cross, supra note 58 at 287-91, 312-13. 
75.  Dewar, “Reformator,” supra note 12 at 239-41, 247-48; see also Dewar, Pen and Ink, supra
note 11 at 55-66. 
76. Gareth Stedman Jones, “Te Language of Chartism” in James Epstein & Dorothy 
Tompson, eds, Te Chartist Experience: Studies in Working-Class Radicalism and Culture, 
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levels. By taking political control of the primarily agrarian society, the farmers, 
shopkeepers, and artisans making up the majority of the population would also 
be able to crush other monopolies in Upper Canada.77 
Chief among these other targets were the religious and legal systems. Te 
Clear Grits aimed to attack religious privilege by secularizing the clergy reserves 
which gave certain sects an advantage over others in funding. Tis had been a 
major issue since the early 1820s, but at mid-century it was at frst overshadowed 
by the question of legal reform. Te Clear-Grit platform published in the 
North American on 22 November 1850 included “Law Reform” as a subject 
for immediate legislation. Te journal advocated the abolition of Chancery, the 
simplifcation of law proceedings, and the abolition of the monopoly of legal 
services held by the existing legal profession.78 Te Court of Common Pleas 
was also to be done away with; lawyers’ fees were to be reduced, and jury law 
was to be amended. 
Tis interest in the law stemmed mainly from events in the United States. 
While Jeremy Bentham, Lord Henry Brougham, and others in England had 
spoken in favour of simplifying the law and reducing its costs to beneft the poor, 
their rhetoric was less extreme than that of American radicals who argued that 
the complexity of the common law had facilitated the creation of a monopoly. 
It had given the courts great discretionary power while making the law a mystery 
which rendered the profession indispensable, thereby creating a modern legal 
and judicial “aristocracy” which was more in tune with the interests of the rich 
than the poor.79 
During the 1840s, when legal reform seemed almost inevitable on both sides 
of the Atlantic, the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1846 served 
to drive the programme forward. Dominated by radical politicians from both 
American parties, the Convention gave rise to demands for simplifying the law 
and led to a commission on law reform headed by David Dudley Field, a long-time 
supporter of legal codifcation. Te resulting Field Codes of 1848 and 1850 were 
revolutionary for their time and especially infuential in New York where the 
Court of Chancery was abolished in 1848 and law and equity were combined 
under one court system. Te new regulations also abolished the common-law 
77. Dewar, “Reformator,” supra note 12 at 235-36, 240; Gidney & Millar, supra note 4 at 49-51. 
78. Toronto Examiner (18 September 1849, 16 January 1850), Ottawa, Library and Archives 
Canada (accessed on microflm); North American (4 June, 22 November 1850), Ottawa, 
Library and Archives Canada (accessed on microflm). 
79. Friedman, supra note 1 at 69-70; Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr, Te Age of Jackson (Little, Brown, 
1945) at 329-30. 
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forms of action and simplifed pleadings. Te 1850 code was eventually adopted, 
or partially adopted, in at least twenty-four American states.80 
Tese developments drove on discontent with the court system in Upper 
Canada. In April 1850, Charles Clarke’s “Reformator” made several proposals for 
reform that would be taken up by other sources. First, he argued for decentralizing 
the legal system by abolishing the Chancery Court and the Court of Common 
Pleas and increasing the jurisdiction of the regional courts. Second, echoing 
American arguments, he proposed that the law system be codifed so that it “may 
be found on the library shelves of every mechanic, merchant, and citizen.”81 
His third demand was that the responsibility for setting legal fees be transferred 
from the profession, as embodied by the judges, to Parliament where laymen 
could exercise more control. Finally, he posited that jurymen be paid in the same 
way as other ofcers. Te founding convention of the Clear-Grit movement 
at Markham in March 1850 had actually gone a step further, demanding that 
the jurisdiction of the Division Courts and their appointed judges should be 
transferred to municipal and township courts, which presumably would be 
stafed by elected ofcials.82 
Te Clear Grits were particularly critical of the legal profession. Like 
British and American radicals, they subscribed to a labour theory of value which 
distinguished between occupational groups that produced material wealth and 
those that did not.83 Since agriculture was the lynchpin of Upper Canada’s 
economy, farmers were vitally important as producers of food, though artisans, 
such as blacksmiths and tailors, also produced goods of value. While the economy 
depended on the output of these people, their labour was exploited by persons 
who relied on this production without adding any tangible value to it, such as 
leading merchants, bankers, and the parasitic lawyers. Te Upper Canadians 
adopted American proposals to break down the privileged position of the legal 
profession by opening it to competition and reducing legal fees.84 
Some provincial radicals were also encouraging the use of the traditional 
process of arbitration—usually employed in commercial cases—in disputes 
80. Wilentz, supra note 13 at 593; Friedman, supra note 1 at 293-95, 303-06. 
81. Toronto Mirror (12 April 1850) Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on 
microflm); Howe, supra note 13 at 440. 
82. Public meeting at Markham to support Grit principles reported in the Toronto Globe. See 
Toronto Globe (21 March 1850). 
83. For the British and American viewpoints, see respectively Stedman Jones, supra note 76 at 
18, 31-34; Benson, supra note 13 at 94-97. 
84. Toronto Mirror (19 April 1850) Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada 
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involving persons of limited means in the hope of reducing the infuence of 
lawyers and avoiding the complexities of the court system. Tis idea would have 
entailed the involvement of neighbours in solving local disputes which might 
have been impractical given the marked reluctance of many Upper Canadians 
to take part in juries and other local institutional bodies at the time.85 However, 
it was proposed in the Niagara region as an idealistic and even Christian-utopian 
means of building community harmony. Tis viewpoint may refect the infuence 
of similar arguments being made at this time in western New York, directly 
adjacent to Niagara, where the religious revival of the “Second Great Awakening” 
was underway.86 In Niagara, there had already been a steady source of petitions 
in favour of legal reform before a meeting held at Howard’s Hotel in the town 
of Niagara in autumn 1850 resulted in the formation of the Niagara Town and 
Township Association for the Suppression of Litigation, and the Settlement of 
Disputes by Arbitration. At the meeting, participants argued that complaints 
were often brought to lawyers and the courts from a spirit of avarice with the goal 
of getting a favourable result regardless of fairness. Tis led to bitterness and the 
ruin of both parties to a suit, especially when lawyers might be more concerned 
with their own fnancial interests than those of their clients. While pushing for 
arbitration, the members of the Niagara association also supported court reform. 
Tey advocated extending the jurisdiction of the regional courts and simplifying 
and codifying the law to reduce expense and procrastination. None of these 
reforms was thought possible while lawyers dominated the Assembly.87 
Te interest in arbitration expressed in Niagara was also associated with 
an international campaign to establish conciliation courts. Lord Brougham 
had raised the topic in Britain, proposing to establish conciliation courts on a 
similar basis as those in operation in France, Germany, and other continental 
European states. Te idea had been taken up in America where it was argued that 
conciliation courts would provide faster and cheaper justice and allow citizens 
with limited funds to partake in a judicial system that was equal for all rather than 
tilted in favour of the wealthy. Te original proposal was for parties to submit 
85. See R Blake Brown, A Trying Question: Te Jury in Nineteenth-Century Canada (University of 
Toronto Press, 2009) at 49-51. 
86. Amalia D Kessler, “Deciding Against Conciliation: Te Nineteenth-Century Rejection 
of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial 
Adjudication” (2009) 10 Teor Inq L 423 at 449-50, 453-54; Perry Miller, Te Life of 
the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1965) at 186-88. 
87. “Meeting at Howard’s Hotel,” Niagara Mail (13 November 1850), Toronto, Archives of 
Ontario, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds (MU 1889, fle 5460) [“Meeting at Howard’s Hotel”]. 











their disputes voluntarily to tribunals, which, like those in Europe, were usually 
headed by prominent lay persons rather than professional judges. Deliberating 
without the presence of lawyers, the judges would hold private hearings where 
the disputants might fnd it easier to fnd common ground than in formal public 
hearings. Compromise would be encouraged and binding decisions would be 
based on conscience rather than the rule of law. Te second Field Code, in 1850, 
contained a proposal for conciliation courts which New York State considered but 
never enacted. In Upper Canada, McDougall’s North American was supportive, 
arguing that when such bodies were erected lawyers “will be obliged to earn 
their living honestly by ploughing the land instead of quoting ‘my lord’ this and 
‘my lord’ that.”88 
B. LEGISLATIVE DEBATES, 1850–1853 
Te struggle for reform reached a peak during a series of raucous debates in 
the House between 1850 and 1853. Te question involved four main issues: 
(1) Legal procedure, (2) Te Court of Chancery, (3) Te structure of the legal 
profession, and (4) Te balance of power between the centralized and regional 
courts. In 1850, even before the impact of the Clear Grits was fully felt, lawyer– 
politicians began making eforts to assuage public discontent by proposing 
procedural reforms and the abolition of Chancery. In 1851, radical laymen got 
support from the returning prodigal, William Lyon Mackenzie, who had been 
elected to Parliament shortly after returning from exile in America for his part 
in the Rebellion of 1837. Mackenzie quickly became the leading spokesman 
for legal change. Drawing on ideas he had heard as a journalist attending the 
New York Constitutional Convention of 1846, he made blistering attacks on 
the Law Society’s control over the profession and proposed the establishment of 
conciliation courts as alternatives to the present courts.89 While his arguments 
led to heated exchanges in the House in 1851 and 1852, he was largely stymied 
by the conservative viewpoint of most lawyers and laymen representing Upper 
Canada. By 1852, the Reform Ministry had begun to defect attention from his 
more radical nostrums by proposing limited court reforms of their own. By the 
following year, they were promising more substantial changes, but only after 
reforms being considered in England became law. 
88. North American (19 April 1850), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on 
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Te parliamentary session of 1850 opened with debates over reforming legal 
procedure and abolishing Chancery. Liberal-leaning lawyers introduced at least 
eight unsuccessful bills to simplify procedure during this session and the one in 
1851. By proposing measures that were similar to those being put forward in the 
United States and the Maritime Provinces, they hoped to portray themselves as 
at the forefront of reform and also to refute allegations that the profession was 
avaricious. Reform barrister James Smith claimed to be speaking for most of 
his colleagues when he commented that, “in general lawyers were not over-paid 
for what they did, but that they were required to do a great more than was 
necessary.”90 His bill, and those of others, sought mainly to simplify common-law 
procedure in commercial cases and seem to have had been heavily infuenced by 
the recent reforms in New York. However, the bills do not seem to have been 
sufciently detailed or credible to gain much support. 
Attorney General Robert Baldwin was dead-set against such proposals. Te 
simplicity desired by reformers, he said, was not often possible “among a civilized 
people where transactions were complicated and interests involved important.” 
Te settlement of disputes relied on the existence of precedents which might 
no longer be relevant if the law was reformed. He thought the bills in question 
would overturn procedures understood by all in favour of “the mere skeleton 
of [a new system].”91 Prominent Tory lawyer Sir Allan MacNab believed that a 
commission would be necessary before reforming the law. Even Clear-Grit lawyer 
William McDougall of the North American thought that the lawyers’ bills were 
half measures designed to gain publicity, and the appointment of a commission 
would be necessary for a full-scale overhaul of the law.92 Yet, the government 
made no further efort to move on the question. 
While procedural reform was discussed mainly by lawyers, Chancery was 
the bête noire of the legal system and came under attack from both lawyers and 
laymen. In May 1850, Sir Allan MacNab noted that the public regarded the 
reforms of 1849 “as a job,” and that there was not a more popular issue in the 
country than the abolition of Chancery. As a Tory, he was hardly an objective 
observer, but on the question of Chancery he was not far from wrong. Te 
court was attacked in 1850 and 1851 by moderates and radicals alike. In 1850, 
two lawyers, Henry Smith and John Prince, political moderates representing 
constituencies outside Toronto, introduced motions that would have led to 
90. Debates, supra note 16, vol 9 (1850) at 73. 
91. Ibid at 325, 354. 
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its abolition. In 1851, the call for abolition was echoed more stridently by the 
newly-arrived Mackenzie.93 
Te resentment against Chancery was reaching a peak internationally. 
In England, jurists were considering reform. Te American states of New York 
and Ohio had abolished the court, and the British provinces of Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick were moving in the same direction. While the complexity, 
delays, and costs of equitable procedure were issues in Upper Canada, the chief 
grievance was the court’s centralization. Writing to Mackenzie while he was 
still in New York, Lesslie of the Toronto Examiner had commented that many 
lawyers outside Toronto did not practice in the court and favoured its abolition. 
He might have added, as did the Toronto Patriot, that parties from outside the 
city incurred extra costs as their local counsel had to employ a Toronto agent.94 
Te expense posed a particular problem for people of limited means. Because 
of the court’s location, Mackenzie noted that the court was almost invisible to 
most Upper Canadians until they were dragged into its clutches and underwent 
endless costly proceedings.95 
Tere were other criticisms. In both England and Upper Canada, it was 
believed that Chancery’s archaic procedures did not respect the hard-won rights 
of British subjects under the common law. Since the court relied greatly on the 
evidence of written documents, it was regarded as not providing the parties with 
the prerequisites of a fair trial including open hearings, oral testimony, and, most 
crucially, trial by jury. While the court of equity did sometimes refer disputes 
to the common-law courts for a determination of facts by a jury, this stratagem 
involved the cumbersome process of beginning a feigned common-law action.96 
Te public was also increasingly exasperated by the existence of the two parallel 
systems of law adjudicated in separate courts. It was still possible for a just cause 
to fail because it was launched in the wrong court, and the course of litigation 
93. North American (21 May 1850), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on 
microflm); North American (24 May 1850), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed 
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95. Mackenzie, handwritten note (undated, c1853), Toronto, Archives of Ontario, 
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in each jurisdiction was hampered by the absence of procedures and remedies 
available in the other.97 
Among the Upper-Canadian court’s many sins, was its shrinking credibility. 
During the 1840s, Vice Chancellor Jameson’s decisions had frequently been 
reversed on appeal by the common-law judges, bringing his capability into 
question. In the space of a few months, W.H. Blake and John Godfrey Spragge, 
the two judges appointed in 1849, reversed a series of Jameson’s decrees which 
had allowed actions for ejectment to continue even though the defendants were 
absent from the country. Since large amounts of property were involved in these 
suits, the Legislature moved to enact a law confrming the previous decrees.98 
In spite of these grievances, the court was staunchly defended in Parliament 
by the Reform Ministry and many of its supporters who argued that the 
improvements made by the act of 184999 and by the rules of new Chancellor 
Blake should be given a trial. A major complaint had been about the time and 
expense consumed by the Chancery’s reliance on written bills and interrogatories. 
Acting on the recommendations of the commissioners of 1844–1845, the statute 
of 1849 had replaced the written proceedings with provisions for the parties 
to examine each other viva voce before a judge or a master of the court. One 
legal commentator in Upper Canada noted in 1851 that practice was now faster 
than in England where the traditional bills and interrogatories had been revised 
but not abolished.100 During 1850, provision was also made for the judges of 
the Chancery to appoint masters and deputy registrars in the regions to collect 
testimony and documents for forwarding to the court in Toronto.101 Nonetheless, 
the Chancery judges still sat only in Toronto and depended on the transcripts of 
evidence taken elsewhere rather than hearing it frst-hand and orally. 
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Te votes on the motions of 1850 and 1851 revealed the extent of the court’s 
unpopularity. While some of the most prominent lawyers argued that abolishing 
the court would lead to legal confusion, a slim majority of Upper-Canadian 
members voted against the court in 1850. In the following year, twenty-fve 
Upper Canadians supported abolition, while only nine voted against. Eight 
lawyers voted for the court’s demise.102 Faced with these results, Attorney General 
Baldwin took the opportunity to resign, remarking that he could be of no further 
use to the province since he was unable to protect foundational institutions such 
as the courts “from becoming the sport of demagogue clamour.”103 However, 
regardless of his resignation, the court survived because of the politics of the 
Union: Te majority of Lower-Canadian members voted to support the court for 
the sake of their coalition with Baldwin’s Upper-Canadian Reformers. 
Te session of 1851 represented the apogee of radical dissent in the House. 
It was dominated by the presence of William Lyon Mackenzie who made 
a frontal attack on the legal profession. By this time, many radicals and their 
supporters had become incensed at the infuence of the profession in politics 
and the tight control exerted over it by the Law Society of Upper Canada. Tere 
were allegations once again that Baldwin’s government had replaced the rule 
of the Family Compact with a legal aristocracy headed by the benchers of the 
Law Society of Upper Canada.104 Mackenzie also drew on the public hostility 
being expressed against the professions generally in Upper Canada during the 
early 1850s. Between 1849 and 1851, three attempts to incorporate the medical 
profession were thwarted because of widespread public opposition, especially 
from rural areas where it was believed that the goal was to create a monopoly for 
medical practitioners in Toronto at the expense of traditional practitioners and 
midwives elsewhere.105 
Mackenzie proposed to clothe the legal profession in more democratic garb 
by opening it to competition. His was one of several proposals made during the 
102. Debates, supra note 16, vol 10 (1851) at 562-66, 570; ibid, vol 11 (1852-1853) at 
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1850s that would have ended the Law Society’s monopoly over entrance to the 
profession and allowed anyone to plead for a suitor in a court of law.106 Te critics 
envisaged a free market in legal services in which the most capable individuals 
would rise to the top. Te bar, Mackenzie said, had long been closed to those 
who had not gone through certain preliminaries. He wanted to do away with 
the need to enroll with the Law Society, article with an accredited barrister, and 
pass examinations. In his utopian view, the law should be like a trade. If it was 
simplifed and codifed, it would be possible for “any man who chose to do so, 
to stick up his shingle, and call himself a lawyer, just as he could if he were a 
watch-maker. Te ablest man would always get the greatest practice.”107 He was 
particularly opposed to the apprenticeship system. In his personal papers is a 
note in which he argued that becoming an apprentice usually entailed a personal 
relationship with a barrister that tended to keep persons without infuential 
connections out of the profession.108 Similar ideas had already been persuasive 
in the United States: In the 1840s, Maine, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin 
had eliminated all restrictions for entry except good behaviour. In the British 
province of Nova Scotia, Joseph Howe’s “Free Trade in Law” Act of 1850 took 
advantage of anti-lawyer sentiment to permit any litigant to appoint any lay 
person to represent him in court.109 
Such schemes had less chance of success in Upper Canada. While Solicitor 
General John Sandfeld Macdonald noted the resentment against lawyers in 
many rural areas, commenting that “country constituencies” would be happy “to 
do away altogether with lawyers,”110 the strength of the profession in the House 
and the conservative tendencies of many lay members made changes unlikely. 
Opening the profession would threaten the livelihoods of existing lawyers and 
endanger their social status. Moreover, they had been taught that their training 
under the Law Society was necessary precisely because they were not to be 
tradesmen but leaders and protectors of the constitution.111 Most lawyers and 
other members of the House also believed that the existing regulations protected 
the vulnerable. As Robert Baldwin had commented in 1850, lawyers would still 
106. Debates, supra note 16, vol 9 (1850) at 324-25; ibid, vol 10 (1851) at 1203-206; ibid, vol 11 
(1852–53) at 670-71, 700-701. 
107. Ibid, vol 10 (1851) at 1204. 
108. Mackenzie’s notes, possibly for a speech or article (undated), Toronto, Archives of Ontario, 
Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds (fle 5471, MU 1890). 
109. Friedman, supra note 1 at 236-37, 498-500; Girard, “Married Women,” supra
note 1 at 114-15. 
110. Debates, supra note 16, vol 10 (1851) at 368. 
111. Baker, “Education,” supra note 2 at 50-51. 










be paid in a free market, but “the ignorant might be imposed on.”112 Crucially, 
Mackenzie’s proposals also failed to make any provision for legal training. While 
George Brown of Te Globe was critical of the Law Society’s control, he thought 
that examinations would be essential to ensure that lawyers were capable. 
He argued that the proposals tore down existing regulations without ofering 
anything substantive in their place. For all these reasons, the bill was defeated 
both in 1851 and when it was re-introduced in 1852.113 
Mackenzie also proposed the establishment of conciliation courts in 1851. 
Like the participants of the Niagara meeting in August 1850, he professed 
to believe that Christians had a moral responsibility to solve their diferences 
personally and amicably without resorting to an adversarial process which tended 
only to embitter relations between them. He was again critical of manipulative 
lawyers whom he believed used disputes to bear of “the prizes contended for, 
while the angry disputants themselves were left to mourn their obstinacy[.]”114 
His comments raised the hackles of the legal practitioners in the House, but also 
brought forward applause from his supporters in the galleries. Besides reducing 
the infuence of lawyers, his bill also sought to ofer a quicker, cheaper, and more 
informal means of settling disputes than the traditional courts. 
Mackenzie’s proposal was based almost word-for-word on similar measures 
in New York’s Field Code. Bending to popular pressure, the commissioners had 
agreed to recommend the establishment of tribunals on the European model 
in which the judges would meet privately with the disputing parties without 
lawyers and witnesses, but Field and his colleagues had one proviso. Instead of 
lay judges, the tribunals should be presided over by New York State’s professional 
county court judges. If the parties consented, the decisions of these judges would 
be binding and could be enforced like any judgment after a memo fled in the 
County Court. Mackenzie urged the adoption of the same provisions in Upper 
Canada and claimed that the resulting tribunals would be helpful, particularly to 
the disadvantaged because they would prevent delays which tended to “increase 
expense and anxiety of mind, unsettle men’s plans of life, give to the rich an 
unjust and … advantage over the humble, and are very unfavorable to the 
administration of justice.”115 
112. Debates, supra note 16, vol 9 (1850) at 325. 
113. Ibid, vol 10 (1851) at 1203-206; ibid, vol 11 (1852–53) at 670-71, 1207; North American (3 
September 1852), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on microflm). 
114. Debates, supra note 16, vol 10 (1851) at 364, 371. 
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In spite of strong opposition from the lawyers in both parties, this proposal was 
not easily defeated. John Sandfeld Macdonald and William Buell Richards spoke 
on behalf of the government and noted that the county court judges were already 
badly overworked since they had to preside over the County Court, the Quarter 
Sessions, the Surrogate Court, and all the Division Courts in their counties. John 
A. Macdonald eventually argued that a system in which a judge made decisions 
behind closed doors with no possibility of a court appeal would threaten the 
rule of law.116 Similar concerns had already been expressed in the United States 
and Britain, but the prospect of a cheaper and less dilatory process for settling 
disputes was attractive in Upper Canada. Te bill gained substantial support 
in the Assembly, especially from representatives of “country constituencies,” 
including several of the lawyers who had earlier supported procedural reform.117 
Te vote from Upper-Canadian members was almost evenly split and, once 
again, a question afecting Upper Canada was decided in the government’s favour 
by Lower-Canadian votes. A similar bill was introduced in 1852 and, according 
to Mackenzie’s later comments, passed a second reading before the majority of 
the lawyers rallied to defeat it in committee of the whole.118 It was more easily 
defeated when it was introduced yet again in the next session.119 
Te driving force in the session of 1852–1853 slipped from the hands of the 
radicals to the new Reform Ministry in Upper Canada, led by Francis Hincks. 
William Lyon Mackenzie found himself increasingly isolated after December 
1852 when two Clear Grits joined the provincial Cabinet. Te other radicals 
were now more reluctant to criticize the ministry. William Buell Richards, the 
new Attorney General for Upper Canada, took the initiative by introducing 
two bills dealing with procedural reform. He was well aware of developments in 
England where the frst report of the common-law commission on reform had 
led to the English Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. Since it was reported that 
the commissioners were working on further changes, he was hesitant to do more 
before they were announced.120 
Richards’s frst bill, which extended a limited equity jurisdiction to the 
County Courts, seems to have been based largely on the ideas of Judge James 
Robert Gowan of Simcoe who was quickly becoming the Province of Canada’s 
116. Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 (1851) at 368-69; ibid, vol 12 (1854-55) at 3418. 
117. Ibid, vol 10 (1851) at 368. 
118. North American (20 June 1851), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on 
microflm); Debates, supra note 16, vol 12 (1854–55) at 3418-19. 
119. Debates, supra note 16, vol 12 (1854–55) at 408, 3419; Toronto Globe (21 May 1855), 
Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed on microflm). 
120. See Robert A Harrison, Te Common Law Procedure Act, 1856 (Maclear & Co, 1858) at 1. 














chief advisor on Upper Canada’s lower courts. Gowan, who based his thinking on 
similar proposals made for the English County Courts, hoped such an innovation 
might reduce “the hue and cry against Chancery” and answer complaints against 
its limited accessibility to persons outside Toronto.121 While Richards presented 
the bill in the House as a trial of the principle of joining equity and common law, 
he was also hoping to head of “a complete remodeling of the whole procedure” 
before more study took place. Nonetheless, his reform was welcomed in the 
House and became law.122 
Richards’s second bill was much more ambitious than the frst but bore 
the imprint of similar thinking. It was a mammoth ninety-three-page draft of 
the very kind of reform that he seems to have hoped to forestall, at least for 
the time being: A general simplifcation of the procedures of the common law 
and equity and their consolidation into one unifed system. No copy of the bill 
seems to have survived. Te British Colonist, usually moderately conservative in 
tone, was favourable and reported that there was to be “a simple form of action” 
and that proceedings would be “conducted not in a distorted interpretation of 
words … but in a plain statement, in plain language.”123 Te measure seems to 
have been introduced to satisfy the demand for discussing reform, but not to 
lead to legislation. After setting it aside for public consideration, the government 
signaled that it would proceed no further during the session.124 
Te bill got mixed reviews. While the British Colonist praised the measure 
as the dawn of “a new era,” it also saw one egregious weakness: Te burden that 
the law placed on the poor. As long as court ofcials depended on fees, the poor 
would be shut out of the courts: “Let all the ofcials, like the Judges, be paid from 
the revenues of the Province … Te jurisprudential institutions of a country … 
should not be guided by a test which makes wealth the passport to their halls.”125 
Other commentators were more critical. Judge Gowan remarked enigmatically 
that there were things in the bill which were “difcult to reconcile.”126 A barrister 
121. Letter from Gowan to Baldwin (21 April 1850) Toronto, Toronto Reference Library (Robert 
Baldwin fonds); letters from Gowan to Richards (1, 8, & 11 September 1852), Ottawa, 
Library and Archives Canada (Letterbook 8, accessed on microflm in the Gowan fonds). 
122. Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 (1852–53) at 753. For the bill, see An Act to confer Equity 
Jurisdiction upon the several County Courts in Upper Canada, and for other purposes therein 
mentioned S Prov C 1852-53 (16 Vict), c 119. 
123. British Colonist (11 February 1853), Press clipping, Mackenzie-Lindsey fonds, supra note 50. 
124. Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 (1852–53) at 3011; Toronto Globe (9 October 1852), Ottawa, 
Library and Archives Canada (accessed on microflm). 
125. British Colonist (11 February 1853); British Colonist (15 February 1853). 
126. Letter from Gowan to Richards (12 October 1852), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada 
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writing in the British Colonist was less diplomatic, describing the bill as “crude, 
cumbrous and ill-digested” and calling for lawyers to form a Law Amendment 
Society in order to give the subject the more detailed study it deserved.127 
When debate resumed in the spring of 1853, Richards brought in only modest 
reforms to the courts of common law. He got approval for minor procedural 
changes in a bill designed to equalize the amount of business being heard by the 
courts of Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas. For the rest, he preferred to await 
further developments in Britain where the second report of the English Common 
Law Commissioners had been released but not yet incorporated into law.128 Tis 
cautious approach contrasts with the rapidity with which Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick moved to implement many provisions of the frst English Common 
Law Procedure Act in 1853 and 1854 respectively.129 
Richards took a similar position in relation to Chancery after Mackenzie 
brought a third motion for the court’s abolition in 1853. When it was also 
defeated by Lower Canadian votes, Richards acknowledged that Upper Canada 
was clearly opposed to the court. Te ministry would now be pledged to abolish 
the Chancery pending the release of the opinions of the judges in England.130 
Te reforms of 1849 had also reopened confict over the balance of power 
between the centralized and regional courts. Radicals, and some moderate regional 
spokesmen, were upset that it had been the central courts, and not the regional 
courts, that had been expanded in 1849. Tey were joined by Conservative 
lawyers who were unimpressed with the need for a larger superior court system 
and, in some cases, looking for an issue on which to attack the Ministry. Most of 
the criticism hinged on the fact that the superior courts had not been overworked 
before the reforms. Te British Colonist, for example, regarded the new Court 
of Common Pleas as duplicating the Queen’s Bench and thus redundant. Its 
creation, along with the enlargement of Chancery, had taken place mainly for 
political reasons. “A Barrister,” writing in the British Standard, published at 
Perth, Upper Canada thought that, because of limited court business, one of the 
superior courts of common law should be abolished and the number of judges in 
127. “A Law Reformer,” British Colonist (22 March 1853), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada 
(accessed on microflm). 
128. Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 (1852–53) at 1904, 2318, 2855-56, 3106, 3318. 
129. Nova Scotia, Second Report of the Law Reform Commission (1853) Journals and 
Proceedings of the House of Assembly, Appendix 16, online: <eco.canadiana.ca/view/ 
oocihm.9_00946_104/430> [perma.cc/32RG-JCSU]; Te Public Statutes of the Province of 
New Brunswick passed in the Year 1854 (J Simpson, 1854), online: <eco.canadiana.ca/view/ 
oocihm.9_02186/4> [perma.cc/SD26-NCFA]. 
130. Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 (1852–53) at 2714, 3005-22. 











the Chancery reduced to one, pending its abolition.131 In 1853, eleven “liberal” 
members of the Assembly from Upper Canada sent a letter to the leader of the 
Upper-Canadian section of the government, Francis Hincks, urging the abolition 
of Common Pleas. Te signers argued that the court was “a most unnecessary and 
expensive complication,” which had been superseded for all purposes by the more 
economical and regionally oriented County Courts. Hincks was conciliatory on 
this, as he was on other aspects of legal reform, pledging to take up the question 
in the next session while noting that public opinion seemed to favour changes 
of an even “more extensive character” than those suggested in the letter.132 
He could not know that political circumstances would make further action on 
his part impossible. 
Te fip side of the issue was the question of the jurisdiction of the regional 
courts. Pressure continued to be exerted from outside Toronto for an increase 
in the jurisdictions of the lower courts in order to save suitors from having to 
use the superior courts where costs were thought to be too high. Te leaders of 
both parties were aware of the resentment against the Judicature Acts and willing 
to make some concessions, but not to the extent of completely overhauling the 
court system or making reforms that would require a substantial outlay of new 
funds. Instead, they expressed concern over the congestion of legal business that 
might result from encouraging too much “cheap law” at the local level. 
On the advice of several county court judges,133 the Reform Ministry 
increased the jurisdiction of the lower courts in 1850 in an efort to reduce rural 
discontent. Solicitor General Sandfeld Macdonald expanded the jurisdiction of 
the Division Courts, even though some observers warned that permitting larger 
claims might compromise the ability of these bodies to fulfll their original role 
of dealing quickly and cheaply with small claims.134 Te fnancial jurisdiction 
131. British Colonist (15 February 1853), Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada (accessed 
on microflm); British Standard (27 August 1852), Press clipping, Mackenzie-Lindsey 
fonds, supra note 50. 
132. “A Letter to Hincks,” North American (10 May 1853); Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 
(1852–53) at 3114-15. 
133. Letters from Gowan to Baldwin (21 April, 20 July 1850), Toronto, Toronto Reference 
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WYLIE, THE “MAJESTIC EQUALITY” OF THE LAW 419 
of the County Courts, which had replaced the District Courts in 1849, was 
also expanded.135 Tough they presided over diferent geographical areas than 
the old courts, they had been initially similar in most other respects, including 
jurisdiction and procedures. 
In spite of the changes, regional politicians continued to make demands for 
an even broader role—especially for the Division Courts. For the Clear Grits and 
radicals, such as William Lyon Mackenzie, diverting as much business as possible 
from the central courts to the Division Courts was part and parcel with their 
desire to decentralize governmental institutions generally in order to eliminate 
concentrations of power.136 Even some prominent Tory laymen exhibited a 
sensitive ear for these kinds of issues, perhaps from a desire to embarrass the 
Reform government, but also quite possibly from a desire to support creditors in 
their regions.137 
Te leading lawyers in the House strongly resisted these demands. In the 
session of 1852–1853, Attorney General Richards, among others, emphasized 
that further increasing the jurisdiction would risk slowing the pace of justice and 
raising legal costs, thus defeating the goal of making justice available to everyone. 
Richards, however, went further, arguing that the change would have the efect 
of “inducing people to dispute what they otherwise should not.” “Cheap law,” 
he said, though generally desirable, was not always so.138 Te pitfalls of “cheap 
law” had also been cited during the debate on Mackenzie’s bill to establish 
conciliation courts in 1851, when Solicitor General Macdonald argued that 
cheap law would only lead to an undesirable proliferation of cases.139 In reality, 
it should have been evident that continuing to expand the jurisdiction of the 
small claims courts would require the government to make more investments in 
them, perhaps by restructuring them or appointing more judges. Tis was not a 
step that the leaders of Upper Canada were willing to consider. 
135. An Act to alter and amend the Act replacing the Practice of the County Courts in Upper Canada, 
and to extend the jurisdiction thereof, S Prov C 1850 (13 & 14 Vict), c 52. 
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Te possibility of major legal reform, which probably appeared strong in 1853, 
seemed much less so afterwards. While the Reform Party under the leadership 
of Francis Hincks in Upper Canada seemed poised to act, it was soon rocked 
by scandal and was eventually replaced by a moderate coalition of Liberal– 
Conservatives in 1854. Te attention of the public also shifted to other matters. 
In Upper Canada, these included questions of church and state, the perceived 
undue infuence of French Canada, the Grand Trunk Railway, and ultimately 
the future of the Union of the Canadas. Among supporters of the Reform Party, 
religious issues had come to the fore. Tey included the old problem of the clergy 
reserves, which the Reform Ministry had failed to resolve, and a new question 
with both religious and ethnic implications—Upper Canada’s Roman Catholic 
separate schools. Under pressure from the Catholic Church, the government had 
passed legislation in 1850 facilitating the development of a large state-supported 
separate school system.140 Te issue infamed many Protestants who favoured 
the separation of church and state and saw state-church forces cutting into the 
non-sectarian public-school system. Te reform also touched on ethnic and 
sectional questions because, like the Court of Chancery issue, the creation of 
separate schools had been determined against the wishes of the majority of 
the Upper-Canadian members by Lower-Canadian votes. On the question of 
separate schools, many radicals and other Upper-Canadian supporters of the 
Reform Party, who had previously spoken out against privilege in the legal 
system, showed themselves even more virulently opposed to Catholicism and the 
infuence of French Canada.141 
With the attention of the public elsewhere, the question of court reform 
became one of interest primarily to lawyers and soon passed into the hands 
of John A. Macdonald, Upper-Canada’s new Attorney General. He based his 
Common Law Procedure Acts of 1856 and 1857 closely on the English reform acts 
of 1852 and 1854, stating that, except for minor changes necessitated by uniquely 
Upper-Canadian circumstances, he would go no farther than the English model 
which had been established after much deliberation by the home profession. His 
reforms simplifed the procedures of the common law and allowed access in the 
common-law courts to certain remedies previously accessible only in the equity 
140. An Act for the better establishment and maintenance of Common Schools in Upper Canada, 
S Prov C 1850 (13 & 14 Vict), c 48. 
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court. He was not ready to abolish Chancery, but he was willing to introduce 
changes to suit provincial conditions. For the frst time, the court’s judges were 
empowered to go on circuit, which made equitable remedies more readily 
available to “country” practitioners and their clients. And, responding to public 
demand, he permitted Chancery to employ juries for the frst time.142 
Tese changes removed some of the diferences between common-law and 
equitable courts without merging the two systems altogether. It was still possible 
for a just cause to fail because it was launched in the wrong court, and for the 
course of litigation to result in the parties having to access both courts. However, 
as imperfect as they were, Macdonald’s reforms had done much to satisfy the most 
pressing demands for change as political attention turned to other questions. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Te mid-nineteenth century was a period when the need for procedural reform 
was clear, and repeated demands for change were being made not only in Upper 
Canada but also in many parts of the common-law world. While the conservatism 
of Upper Canada’s legal profession during the early nineteenth century is well 
known, G. Blaine Baker has pointed out that the 1840s and 1850s were decades 
when the leading lawyers in both Upper and Lower Canada took the initiative 
in creating legislation relating to basic institutions, such as municipalities, public 
education, general incorporation, and bankruptcy, among others.143 Besides 
these innovations, Upper Canada’s leaders also pushed successfully for legislation 
expanding the superior courts in Toronto. From that vantage point, their 
reluctance to act on procedural reform seems peculiar. Not just another example 
of a broad ideological conservatism, it speaks to the depth of their conservatism 
on this particular issue even in the face of fairly widespread public demands. 
142. Debates, supra note 16, vol 13 (1856) at 461; An Act to amend and consolidate the provisions 
of certain Acts therein mentioned, and to simplify and expedite the proceedings in the Courts 
of Queen’s Bench and Common Please in Upper Canada, S Prov C 1856 (19 & 20 Vict), 
c 43; An Act to amend the Common Law Procedure Act of 1856, and to facilitate the remedies 
on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, S Prov 1857 (20 Vict), c 57; An Act for further 
increasing the efciency and simplifying the proceedings of the Court of Chancery, S Prov C 1857 
(20 Vict), c 56. 
143. Baker, “Historiography,” supra note 3 at 10; Baker, “Benthanism,” supra note 3 at 285-91. 
Baker notes that the legal profession in Lower Canada brought in major changes to the legal 
system during this period, including a new a civil code—which throws the cautious approach 
in Upper Canada into sharp relief (ibid). 





Even the expansion of the superior courts was not achieved without criticism. 
Te misgivings expressed by some lawyers and laymen outside of Toronto 
refected their interests which difered from those of the most prominent lawyers 
and politicians of the province. Te leaders of the profession tended to gravitate 
towards the superior courts at Toronto and believed that they represented the 
heart of the system. While they realized the need for regional courts and sought 
to standardize their procedure, they were often less familiar with the day-to-day 
workings of these bodies and had to depend on the advice of county court 
judges. Even then, they tended to regard these courts as secondary priorities. 
However, for lawyers and laymen outside of Toronto, the lower regional courts 
were more convenient and less costly to use than the superior courts. Te bulk 
of the courtroom practice of the lawyers in particular probably took place in 
the District (and later County) Courts, which also would have accounted for a 
signifcant part of their income. 
Tis periodic tension within the profession was mirrored in phraseology. 
Te term “country lawyer” seems to have been broadly embraced in the legal 
community to diferentiate a member of the profession situated in the smaller 
towns and rural areas of the province from those in Toronto and other major 
centres such as Kingston. We have seen Henry Sherwood dismissing Conservative 
barrister George Macdonell from Dundas as “a country lawyer” when the latter 
proposed to expand the jurisdiction of the District Courts in 1847. As the 
controversy heated up, the term “Toronto” also sometimes became an epithet. 
Frustrated by the reluctance of Robert Baldwin and his colleagues to consider 
change, George Byron Lyon, a lawyer-politician from Russell, lashed out in 1850 
that: “Toronto lawyers were opposed to any bill that would afect their pockets. 
Tese parties were opposed to any change in the present system, which gave all 
the profts of the profession to them.” Other “country” lawyers expressed similar 
sentiments. Te confict between Toronto and the outlying regions has been 
referred to before by G. Blaine Baker. He saw it originating in the 1850s over 
the Law Society’s policy of concentrating legal education solely in Toronto, but 
the debates of the Union period suggest the dichotomy was present earlier and 
extended beyond one issue.144 
On the question of legal procedure, there were only a few exceptions to 
the reluctance of lawyers to act in advance of the English example. Several 
144. Baker, “Education,” supra note 2 at 52, 98; Debates, supra note 16, vol 6 (1847) at 376-78; 
ibid, vol 9 (1850) at 325-26. See also Letter from George Macdonald, Cornwall, to John 
Sandfeld Macdonald (6 June, 1850) vol 1 (MG24-B30) at 202-06, Ottawa, Library and 
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members of the profession did advance proposals for procedural change, but 
these were quickly rejected by members of the Assembly who believed they were 
premature and lacking in credibility. Even the judges were sometimes willing 
to countenance changes in procedure if local conditions required it and other 
jurisdictions were seen to be moving in that direction. Tis willingness was more 
noticeable in relation to equity than common law. Te Chancery commissioners 
of 1844–1845, led by a common-law expert and arch-conservative Chief Justice 
Robinson, proposed signifcant changes in equitable procedure at a time when 
similar reforms were also being discussed elsewhere. Blake’s Judicature Acts of 
1849, besides revamping court structure, codifed these proposals which he 
then implemented as Chancellor of the Court of Chancery. But Blake was more 
reform-minded than most leading members of the profession. R.C.B. Risk, who 
frst analyzed the conservatism of the judges, described him as the only jurist of 
the mid-century period in Upper Canada who felt responsible for adapting the 
law to local conditions, although never to the extent of challenging established 
English precedents. As a legislator, he displayed a similar ambivalence. While his 
willingness to consider equitable reform was similar to that of Nova Scotia legal 
reformers discussed by Philip Girard, his goals were more conservative, and his 
strategy was intended in no small measure to head of the growing demand for 
Chancery’s demise.145 
Tis emphasis on caution contrasted with action taken elsewhere. We have 
seen that, during a period when Chancery was being abolished in at least two 
American states as well as in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, Upper Canada’s 
leaders fought to preserve the court. Similarly, while the need for common-law 
procedural reform was widely recognized and discussed, W.B. Richards and 
John A. Macdonald refused to act in advance of the fndings of the English law 
commissioners. Te two Maritime Provinces had confronted these challenges 
by establishing law commissions to consider ways of simplifying the law and 
bringing the common law and equity closer together. Te fndings of these 
commissions resulted in procedural reform in Nova Scotia in 1853 and New 
Brunswick in 1854. Tere were repeated calls for a similar commission in Upper 
Canada from all parts of the political spectrum—Tories, Reformers, and Clear 
Grits—but nothing was done.146 At a time when recent American innovations in 
145. Risk, supra note 2 at 429-30; Girard, “Married Women,” supra note 1 at 89. 
146. North American (2 August 1850, 3 June 1851, 11 June 1851, 15 July 1851), Ottawa, 
Library and Archives Canada (accessed on microflm); Debates, supra note 16, vol 11 
(1852–53) at 3005-21. 





procedure were being studied even by the law commissioners in England, Upper 
Canada still waited on developments in the home country. 
Tis study has traced the conservatism of the legal profession to two related 
sources: Te prevailing political and social ideology of prominent people and the 
particular training of the lawyers. Te dominant ideology centred on the value 
of the British connection and the benefts of the unwritten British Constitution, 
which the Law Society urged lawyers to defend. While the constitution had 
evolved by mid-century to include a political system more responsive to “public 
opinion,” the transition to responsible government did not refect the acceptance 
of democratic or egalitarian ideas which were still feared for their demagogic 
potential.147 Tis fact made it unlikely that the province’s lay and legal leaders 
would be receptive to the proposals of Upper Canada’s radicals on legal or political 
change. However, the reluctance of the leading lawyers to initiate procedural 
reform in particular probably owes much more to their legal training. Te 
intensive tutelage in common law and equity they received under the auspices of 
the Law Society of Upper Canada bred a respect for case law and for English legal 
tradition which would have tended to make them particularly cautious on this 
question. In spite of their willingness to improve municipal and other institutions, 
the lawyers deferred to the opinions of the English judges on procedure. 
Te re-emergence of radicalism at the end of the 1840s represented a direct 
challenge to Upper Canada’s social and political leaders. Although the Clear 
Grits and other radicals did not advocate rebellion, they were clearly heirs to 
the tradition of Mackenzie and his supporters of the 1830s. Like the latter, the 
mid-century radicals grounded their analysis on thinking in both Britain and the 
United States. Drawing particularly on American radical rhetoric of the 1840s, 
they believed that both the legal and political institutions of the province served 
to beneft the most infuential persons in Upper Canada at the expense of the 
“common people.” For this reason, they proposed changes in both the legal and 
political spheres. 
On the question of legal reform, the radicals became the spokesmen for a 
point of view that was suspicious of the existing law, hostile to its arcane language, 
complexity, and cost, and resentful of its association with privilege. While there 
was considerable support among leading citizens in the regions for decentralizing 
the courts and modernizing the law, especially after the Judicature Acts of 1849, 
the hostility in some rural areas ran well beyond a desire for decentralization. Te 
regions around Toronto and the Niagara Peninsula appear to have constituted 
particular hotbeds of such feeling. Solicitor General John Sandfeld Macdonald 
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referred to areas like these in 1851 with his comment that many country 
constituencies would be happy “to do away altogether with lawyers.”148 Te 
thinking of these people was manifested during the debate over the abolition 
of the Courts of Requests in 1841 when W.H. Merritt and fve other rural 
representatives of the Assembly expressed confdence in the capability of their 
communities to adjudicate small claims without the intervention of lawyers, and 
to do it more cheaply and in a less adversarial style than the formal courts. Te 
meeting at Howard’s Hotel in the town of Niagara in 1850 took this attitude a 
step further when participants condemned the existing law from a Christian and 
moralistic point of view because its complexity tended to obscure the ideal of 
justice. Such viewpoints were often accompanied by a desire for local control of 
afairs and a suspicion of trained professionals as outsiders.149 
How widespread were such views in Upper Canada? We get only glimpses 
of anti-legal attitudes in the newspapers across the province and in the 
correspondence of William Lyon Mackenzie who was a sounding board for this 
kind of thought. While similar attitudes were expressed by persons from many 
parts of Upper Canada, it is not clear how extensively they were held in each 
area. Te difculty stems from the lack of extant evidence regarding the points 
of view of the farmers and other “common” people who made up the majority of 
the population. It is no coincidence that historians have focused primarily on the 
views of prominent people, for their opinions were more likely to have survived. 
We know that sentiment critical of the law and legal profession was common in 
the history of western Europe and North America, especially in rural areas. Views 
like those in Upper Canada were also being expressed at this time in the United 
States and other parts of British North America. Greg Marquis has described how 
farmers in New Brunswick were being urged to elect producers rather than greedy 
lawyers. Philip Girard found that the law was condemned in Nova Scotia as 
antiquated, overly expensive, and the creature of privileged special interest groups 
including lawyers and others.150 In Upper Canada, there were only a handful 
of radicals arguing these points in the Assembly. Tey were vociferous in their 
condemnations of lawyers and the legal system, but their radical program as a 
whole, embracing both political and legal reform, failed to attract broad electoral 
support, even from rural areas. At least in electoral terms, radicalism made only 
148. Debates, supra note 16, vol 10 (1851) at 368. 
149. Ibid, vol 1 (1841) at 484-88; “Meeting at Howard’s Hotel,” supra note 87. 
150. Marquis, “Anti-Lawyer,” supra note 42 at 163-64, 165-66; Kessler, supra note 86 at 446, 
449-50; Girard, “Married Women,” supra note 1 at 81. 
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limited headway against the moderate–conservative consensus promulgated by 
the province’s leading residents. 
Nor was the popular interest in legal reform long lasting. Te fact that the 
question attracted attention for only a short time and then was pushed aside by 
ethnic, religious, and other rivalries suggests that, while there was hostility to 
the legal system, legal reform was not usually a high priority. Widespread public 
interest in court reform had been the product of specifc time-related events: 
the desire for the legal system to meet the developmental needs of the province, 
the prevalence of international debate over court reform, and the momentous 
social and political upheavals taking place in North America and overseas which 
raised the hopes of radicals that systemic change in Upper Canada’s courts 
might be possible. 
